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Information and Party Brands
Stephanie A. Nail
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Merced
Abstract
In the first part of my dissertation, I address the puzzle of how majority
parties can create a legislative reputation that appeals to two very different
constituencies – primary and general election voters. I argue that the majority
party leadership strategically sets the agenda to send different informational
signals about party members prior to each election. The findings show that
there is variability in the types of bills that are scheduled at different times
during the year. This suggests that the majority party can send different infor-
mational signals about its members in order to appeal to either the primary
or general election constituency. Furthermore, it suggests that if voters are
myopic, they are not getting the entire picture of the legislator’s behavior and
voting patterns by only looking at recent votes, which could ultimately affect
democracy in the long run.
In my second paper, I argue that party labels can act as information short-
cuts to help voters more reliably guess the issue positions of a representative,
even when voters have no direct information about the representative’s voting
record. I isolate the effect of an individual being “treated” with knowledge
of a representative’s party label as a heuristic using an instrumental variable
design. I characterize each state’s Senate delegation to be either mixed or uni-
fied, with mixed meaning one Republican Senator and one Democrat Senator
and unified meaning two Senators from the same party. I find that knowing a
Senator’s party makes voters 19.5% more likely to correctly guess their posi-
tion on major votes. This finding suggests that party labels can independently
improve citizen inference about their representatives, even when other forms
of knowledge are held relatively constant.
In the last part of my dissertation, I investigate the effect of varying the
level of information conveyed by party brands using an experiment. I argue
that cheaper information has not increased voters’ knowledge about individual
candidates because voters possess an even cheaper and increasingly informative
cue: party id. I propose an experimental design to test how varying levels of
information affect individuals’ willingness to pay for additional information
when the goal is to make a correct decision. I theorize that as the parties
become increasingly distinguishable, individuals will be less willing to pay the
cost of seeking out information on their own individual legislators. I test this
hypothesis using a between-subjects design. Subjects are randomly selected
xiv
to receive a party label or not. I systematically vary the informativeness of
the distribution of votes that they receive according to real-world information
level and measure their willingness to pay for extra information – in this case,
a signal that will help them make their final decision. I use willingness to pay
as the main dependent variable and calculate the average treatment effect for
each informational level (JSD). Over time, willingness to pay for information
has decreased by 30% as the party label has become more informative.
xv
Strategic Agenda Setting and Election Timing
in the U.S. House
Stephanie A. Nail
University of California, Merced
July 9, 2019
Abstract
The legislative cartel model argues that the majority party creates a favorable
party brand through agenda-setting by constructing a set of votes to increase
their members’ chances of reelection. While much of the literature has focused
on a single constituency, the structure of the U.S. electoral system explicitly
builds in two constituencies based on the primary and general elections. In
order to be successful, legislators have incentives to send different signals to
these constituencies at different times in the election cycle. Here, I argue that
the majority party leadership strategically sets the agenda to send different
informational signals about the party’s more moderate members prior to each
election. Using roll-call votes from the 88th-113th Congresses, I find that there
is a larger difference between the cutpoints of bills considered before and af-
ter the primary election in election years than in non-election years. These
findings help resolve the puzzle of why it seems that legislators typically vote
more with their party than would be expected, given the preferences of voters
in the general election.
Keywords: Majority party agenda setting, legislative cartel theory, legislative
voting, election timing
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21 Introduction
The legislative cartel model of congressional parties put forth by Cox and
McCubbins (2005) argues that parties strive to create a favorable party brand.
One way that this can be done is through the use of majority party agenda-
setting. With the power to manipulate the agenda, parties construct a set
of votes that will make their members look good to their constituents (Cox
and McCubbins 2005; Woon and Pope 2008). However, because incumbent
legislators face two elections, namely the primary and general elections, party
brands face two markets with very different sets of consumers. Primary voters
are more interested in more ideologically extreme policy, while general election
constituents are a mix of individuals from both parties, causing the aggregate
preferences of the electorate to be more moderate. This creates a puzzle: How
can parties construct an agenda that advantages their party incumbents in
both of these elections?
To help resolve this puzzle, I draw on a literature that shows voters are
myopic, such that they overweight recent events (Achen and Bartels 2002,
2004; Fiorina 1978; Gelman and King 1993; Wlezien 2015). By creating sep-
arate agendas immediately before and after the primary, legislators are able
to present a different image to voters in the primary election and voters in
the general election, thereby increasing their chances of reelection and conse-
quently, the probability that the majority party maintains its majority status.
To examine this conjecture, I extend the legislative cartel model assump-
tions (Cox and McCubbins 2005) by asserting that the majority party leader-
ship uses its gatekeeping and agenda-setting powers to strategically pick the
order that scheduled bills are brought to the floor. I argue that before the pri-
mary election, the majority party leadership will bring up status quos and bill
proposals that even the majority party’s more moderate members will have no
problems voting for. This increase in party line voting leading up to the pri-
mary election allows the moderate members to look like their preferences are
more in line with the party median than the floor median. After the primary
election, I argue that the majority party leadership will schedule bills that do
not invoke a high level of party line voting and this allows the more moderate
majority party members to defect to the minority side if needed. Depending
on when they are brought up, specific bills can either be beneficial or costly
in terms of how they can be used to construct a legislator’s image. Therefore,
I hypothesize that in election years, there is a larger change in the location of
bill cutpoints before and after the primary election than in non-election years.
To test this hypothesis, I use a difference-in-difference research design
that takes into consideration the difference between election and non-election
3years. The treatment is whether a given year is an election year or not. The
dependent variable is the location of cutpoints on final passage votes, measured
at two different times in a given year (before and after the primary election).
Using data from the 88th-113th Congresses, I find that there is in fact a larger
difference between the mean cutpoint before and after the primary election in
election years than in non-election years.
These results suggest that, with regard to the effects of elections on leg-
islative behavior, we have been thinking too narrowly. We know that moderate
votes can be costly for some legislators (Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Rohde 1991),
but prior to the current study, a theory of the majority party strategically
scheduling votes to help the party’s more moderate members did not exist.
By establishing that primary and general elections are fundamentally different
in terms of the characteristics of the voters that participate in these elections,
we are able to see variability in the type of bills that are scheduled by the
majority party leadership in each period. Potentially, this result could help
us to predict votes before elections more accurately. Furthermore, it implies
that if voters really do take into consideration a legislator’s recent vote history
when they are trying to cast their vote in an election, they are not getting
the entire picture of the legislator’s behavior and voting patterns, which could
ultimately affect voters and democracy in the long-run.
2 Majority Party Agenda-Setting and Elec-
tion Timing
Through previous literature, we know that the majority party has the power
to decide what gets scheduled on the agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Den
Hartog and Monroe 2011). Under the cartel model, the majority party takes
advantage of their status and manages their party brand by overseeing the
outcomes of bills that are voted upon on the floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005).
In addition, the majority party has the ability to divert resources and establish
a reputable record to assist party incumbents with reelection (Smith 2007; Cox
and McCubbins 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Aldrich 1995). Specifically, the
cartel model argues that the majority party uses the agenda to advance the
electoral prospects of its members. Majority party agenda-setting has been
found to affect the legislative process in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate in the United States (Den Hartog and Monroe 2011; Cox and
McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2000a, 2000b).
Overall, advancing the electoral prospects for its members can be tricky
for the majority party because an agenda that benefits some members may
4harm the electoral prospects of other members. We know that voters punish
legislators for not following the preferences of their constituency and also for
voting too partisan on decisive votes (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002;
Carson et al. 2010; Kassow and Finocchiaro 2011). On divisive votes, sticking
to party line voting can be costly (Carson et al. 2010). Because legislators
are unable to predict which roll-call votes will be prominent in the media and
in the minds of their constituents, they must assume that each vote has a
possibility of becoming salient in the future (Fenno 1978).
With agenda-setting powers, the majority party leadership has the ability
to protect members of the party from votes that they might have to pay for
later in terms of reelection probabilities. Forcing members to make moderate
votes at the wrong times is costly (Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Rohde 1991), and
in the opposite situation, making more moderate members vote with the party
on partisan bills can also be costly. Although it has been shown that moderates
can be compensated with side payments for policy loss that they incur through
voting with their party as a result of majority party agenda-setting (Jenkins
and Monroe 2012b; Carroll and Kim 2010), this process could potentially
hurt the reelection probabilities of the moderate members. Furthermore, it
is suggested that the majority party uses its agenda-setting power to prevent
vote splits — meaning that the majority party divides on a given vote — from
ever occurring (Cox and McCubbins 2005).
Legislators who make moderate votes when their constituency advocates
for more partisan-leaning votes may lose votes in the next election. The con-
stituency that votes in the primary election is more partisan than that of the
general election, suggesting that a legislator with a string of moderate votes
leading up to the primary may be punished by constituents and ultimately
receive a lower percent of the vote than they would have received had their
voting pattern been more partisan. Similarly, a legislator who makes extreme
votes leading up to the general election may be punished by general election
constituents who have aggregate preferences that are more similar to the floor
median. There are many things that shape how parties and legislators are
perceived, but an important component is a legislator’s legislative record and
reputation (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Carson et al. 2010; Nyhan
et al. 2012; Woon and Pope 2008; Kim and LeVeck 2013). Therefore, the
current theory focuses on legislative voting behavior.
One aspect that is less discussed is that agendas do not only have heteroge-
nous effects across members and their districts. There are also heterogenous
effects within a member’s district. The reason behind this is that every in-
cumbent member faces two different electoral environments, a primary election
and a general election. Therefore, in trying to construct an agenda to advance
5the electoral prospects of its members, the majority party must also take into
consideration agendas that will allow their candidates to succeed across these
two elections. This is difficult because voters in each type of election have
different preferences. Voters in the primary election tend to be more partisan
than their general election counterparts, and therefore, prefer agendas that
make the incumbent look ideologically closer to their party’s median. In con-
trast, voters in the general election tend to have more moderate preferences,
and therefore, prefer agendas that make incumbent members look more mod-
erate. Little is known about how incumbents and their parties deal with these
competing preferences.
Previous research suggests that voters care more about recent events than
those farther in the past. Individuals are constrained by their ability to com-
prehend and store information about politics in their memory, and tend not
to hold true attitudes (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). Individuals are primed by
events that are salient at the time they are asked for an evaluation (Iyengar et
al. 1984; Krosnick and Kinder 1990), and are also susceptible to bias arising
from the way information is framed by those who make it salient (Iyengar, Pe-
ters, and Kinder 1982; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997; Jacoby 2000; Chong
and Druckman 2007). With regard to benefits created from policies, economic
evaluations, presidential elections, and performance evaluations, voters have
been shown to be myopic, meaning that they focus on more recent events
(Achen and Bartels 2002, 2004; Fiorina 1978; Gelman and King 1993; Wlezien
2015; Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981).
It is possible that voters are myopic for a variety of reasons1. In addition to
memory constraints and lack of true attitudes (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992), it
may be the case that voters only begin to pay attention to political information
in the time immediately leading up to an election (Wlezien 2015). It could also
be the case that since voters may choose to use a online-tally to keep track of
information instead of a memory-based model, most of the information gained
far before the election may have been condensed into a summary evaluation or
forgotten (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989). Unless there is a constant long-
term stream of similar information sent to individuals, it is likely that there
will be no persuasive effect of information on behavior due to decay (Gerber
et al. 2011) and lack of effortful processing (Hill et al. 2017). The observed
myopic effects of persuasive campaign information tend to support a mix of
both the memory-based and online processing models, with the majority of
information losing its effect after six weeks and the accumulation of small
effects over a long period of time lasting a bit longer (Hill et al. 2017).
1See Wlezien (2015) for a more detailed discussion of the possibilities.
6It has also been proposed that voters ignore what happens early in the
election cycle (Achen and Bartels 2004; Wlezien 2015). Similarly, other lit-
erature has contended that individuals do in fact wish to consider all four
years in their evaluation. However, this information is not readily or easily
available to them. Instead, individuals have prominent access to the last year,
and thus, place more weight on it than previous years (Healy and Lenz 2014).
The mechanism behind this idea is the “end heuristic,” which suggests that
individuals substitute the last year for the whole term (Healy and Lenz 2014).
Because voters overweight recent events, legislators have an incentive to
change how they vote based on whether an election is nearer or farther away
in time. Previous research has found evidence consistent with this argument,
showing that a number of legislative behaviors do take the timing of an election
into account (Lindstadt and Vander Wielen 2014; Shepsle et al. 2009). The
benefits associated with credit-claiming influence legislators to save these types
of bills until the end of the session, where they will be more recent in the minds
of voters (Shepsle et al. 2009). In the time leading up to an election, legislators
strategically monitor the amount of votes they make with their party to portray
a more moderate image, thereby placing a higher emphasis on the demands
of their constituency relative to their party (Lindstadt and Vander Wielen
2014). Specifically, this is demonstrated by a decrease in party unity scores
in the second year of a Congressional session (Lindstadt and Vander Wielen
2014)2. There have been documented shifts in ideological stances relative to
the proximity of elections, where legislators appear to be more moderate as the
election (and their possible reelection) approaches (Elling 1982; Wright and
Berkman 1986). As further evidence, these types of shifts are not seen when
the records of retiring legislators are studied (Thomas 1985). One important
idea to note from these studies, however, is that they look at roll-call behavior
change in the years leading up to a Congressional election, not within a given
year as the election gets closer.
Previous literature has not looked at whether the agenda is also respon-
sive to the timing of different types of elections, such as primary and gen-
eral elections. Do parties time votes such that voters in the primary election
will favor the stances taken by incumbent legislators right before the primary
election? Likewise, do parties then change the agenda so that more moderate
general election voters will favor an incumbent’s most recent votes? Currently,
most scholarship assumes (either implicitly or explicitly) that even though the
2Instead of looking at party unity scores across years, in the following sections, this paper
looks at cutpoint locations during a given year and their relationship to the idea of strategic
timing.
7majority party influences the agenda, it does not influence legislator voting be-
havior based on the timing of elections3. This means that the majority party
is monitoring the agenda and scheduling bills that will be considered based on
intended policy outcomes, not reelection probabilities. In the next section, I
present an extension to the cartel model of agenda setting which shows how
parties can construct specific agendas before and after the primary in order to
make incumbents’ recent votes more favorable to each constituency.
3 Theory
Primary elections and general elections are fundamentally different in the sense
that there are different types of voters that participate. In a primary election,
only voters registered to the party can vote, whereas in a general election,
everyone that is registered to vote can participate. We know that primary
election constituents place a high value on roll-call votes that are near their
party median, whereas general constituents have interests that are typically
closer to the chamber median (Bafumi and Herron 2010). Therefore, I argue
that the majority party leadership will strategically set the agenda based on
the timing of the elections. Following from previous literature, I assume that
the policy space of the legislature is unidimensional and that each actor in
the model has single-peaked preferences (Black 1948; Downs 1957; Poole and
Rosenthal 1985, 1987). Additionally, I assume that legislators that are running
in the primary and/or general election have the goal of being reelected (May-
hew 1974). A critical assumption for the theory is that voters get information
in the months leading up to an election, meaning that they are, for the most
part, myopic.
The current theory builds on the basic assumptions and implications of
legislative cartel theory as proposed by Cox and McCubbins (2005). The cartel
model asserts that members of the legislature are motivated by the prospect
of reelection. The majority party brand uses the resources of having majority
party status to help its members stay in office. Therefore, the majority party
has the incentive to capture and disproportionately redistribute the resources
that are available in the legislature to its members. Majority party members
realize the benefits that can be gained from managing the party brand and
therefore delegate power to leaders who act on behalf of the party to capture
3Analysis of roll-call behavior and the introduction of direct primary laws suggests that
there is no relationship between primary elections and legislators making more partisan roll-
call votes (Hirano et al. 2010). It is important to note, however, that Hirano et al. (2010)
use pooled pre and post primary election roll-call behavior to test the relationship.
8the resources available, thus forming a cartel. The party brand is managed by
managing policy output and this is done by gatekeeping (Cox and McCubbins
2005).
I am not assuming that the majority party leadership values moderate
members winning their reelection bids over more partisan members winning
their reelection bids. What I am assuming, is that the majority party val-
ues keeping its majority status, and therefore works to get all of the majority
party members reelected (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2001),
including both moderate and more partisan majority members. The major-
ity party leadership wishes to protect its members from moderate challengers
in the primary election and from extreme challengers in the general election,
without diluting the party’s legislative success and reputation. If the majority
party leadership can strategically structure the timing of the agenda so that
some votes serve the primary election and other votes serve the general elec-
tion, this can send out informational signals about the voting behavior of the
party’s members and also promote legislative success for the party.
Because the majority party has the ability to set the legislative agenda,
only status quos where new proposals can pass without any arm twisting will
be addressed. A key assumption of the cartel model is that all bill proposals
will pass at the floor median of the chamber. The majority party leadership
uses its power to strategically block status quos that are preferred to the floor
median from ever being considered (Cox and McCubbins 2005).
Given that the majority party leadership has the ability to set and control
the legislative agenda through gatekeeping, the only additional assumption
that the current theory adds to the assumptions of the cartel model is that the
majority party leadership can set the order of the agenda. Therefore, I argue
that the majority party leadership strategically sets the agenda according to
the time period. This strategic agenda setting reveals information about the
majority party’s more moderate members at a given time. Their preferences
either look similar to the more partisan majority party members (before the
primary election) or they do not (after the primary election).
There are two actors in this model, the majority party leadership and the
majority party members that are closer to the floor median than the majority
party median (the majority party’s more moderate members). The major-
ity party leadership are members of the majority party that are delegated
leadership power and have the ability to set the agenda. The majority party
leadership wants to pass bills that are ideologically preferable to status quos
(Cox and McCubbins 2005; Groseclose and McCarty 2001). They also want
to use the advantages and resources of majority party status to keep majority
party status and help get the party’s members reelected (Cox and McCubbins
92005; Aldrich and Rohde 2001). The majority party’s more moderate members
are members that have preferences that are closer to the floor median than the
majority party’s median. These members want to get reelected (Mayhew 1974;
Cox and McCubbins 2005), and listen to the preferences of the constituents in
their districts.
Figure 1: Two Cases: A: SQs that will be targeted before the primary
election, B: New SQ region that is targeted following the primary election but
before the general election.
The current theoretical argument is divided into two parts: before the
primary election and after the primary election (Figure 1). Panel A of Figure 1
illustrates the theoretical argument before the primary election. Candidates in
the primary election want to cater to the median voter of the primary election
constituency, which is located around the party median (Mj). Leading up to
the primary election, the majority party leadership creates opportunities for
all members of the party, including the party’s more moderate members, to
look more partisan, thereby increasing their chances of winning in the primary
election. To create these opportunities, I argue that status quos on the far left
(minority side) of the space will be scheduled on the agenda. These status
quos are items that will promote party line voting, meaning that the party’s
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more moderate members will have no problems voting with the majority party
on these items.
To illustrate, let’s imagine hypothetical legislator Mmod who is located
halfway between |2Mmod − F | and F (the floor median) in Panel A of Figure
1. Before the primary election, the majority party leadership wants to make
the party’s more moderate members look like they have preferences closer to
the party median than they actually do. Therefore, they will introduce bills
which will promote all party members voting together so that the preferences of
the more moderate members and the preferences of the party’s more partisan
members will be indistinguishable. When the majority party brings up status
quos that are in the region from −∞ to |2Mmod − F |, the voting behavior of
Mmod and Mj will be identical for any status quo, as they will all vote in favor
of the proposal at the floor median to amend the status quo.
This type of strategic status quo timing allows the majority party lead-
ership to protect the party’s more moderate members. By choosing to bring
up status quos for which the party’s more moderate members will vote with
the rest of the party, their voting behavior will be seen as more partisan. This
increases the probability that the party’s more moderate members will appeal
to the median voter of their primary election constituency, thereby increasing
their chances of reelection4.
3.1 Example: Two Types of Votes
To see why the these differing agendas help protect the majority party’s more
moderate members, consider the following example. If we arrange all 435
members of the House of Representatives on a unidimensional space in terms
of preference on minimum wage policy, let us assume that we are the 221st
4It is logical to think that the size of the majority party might have an effect on the
majority party leadership’s decision to strategically set the agenda based on election timing.
When the majority is large, there should be less incentive to help the members that are closer
to the floor median with reelection. Similarly, when the majority is small, it should be a
high priority to make sure that all of the members (including those that are closer to the
floor median) are reelected so that the party can keep its majority status. Therefore, the
majority party leaders have fewer degrees of freedom to be able to release members who are
closer to the floor median and allow them to vote against the party. In this case, smaller
majorities should be less likely to take election timing into consideration. Given that this is
the first attempt at investigating the influence of election timing on agenda setting, I do not
make the theory more complicated by adding majority size. However, a preliminary test
of the influence of majority size is included in a multivariate model in the Supplementary
Information Appendix, where it is not significant and does not significantly change the point
estimate on election year either.
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most conservative member of the chamber and that there is a Republican
majority. The specific policy brought to the floor by the majority party will
make legislator 226 on the line indifferent between the status quo (SQ) and
the proposed bill (P) (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Simplified Legislature: A hypothetical legislature with 435 mem-
bers with their preferred minimum wage policies portrayed on a unidimensional
space.
Even though we know that we are the 221st member (L221), let us assume
that voters do not have such precise information about our position. Instead,
they take clues from what we have done with the party recently to judge what
kind of Republican we are. On the proposed minimum wage bill, suppose we
vote with the majority leader. In this case, we look the same as the 5th most
conservative member (L5). There is no difference between the signal conveyed
by us and the signal conveyed to voters by the 5th member. In this case,
our behavior is revealed to be identical to a member that is very conservative.
Alternatively, imagine that we vote in opposition of the majority leader. In
this case, we look the same as the 435th legislator (L435). There is no difference
between the signal conveyed by our vote and the signal conveyed by the 435th
member. Now, however, we are conveying a different signal from the 5th
member, allowing us to look more moderate with respect to the majority
party’s more partisan members.
3.2 Predictions
Returning to Figure 1, Panel B illustrates what happens after the primary
election but before the general election. Voters that participate in the general
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election can be from either party in a two-party system, and therefore, the
median voter in this constituency is usually centered closer to the chamber’s
floor median (F ), on average. In the time following the primary election
and leading up to the general election, the majority party leadership creates
opportunities for the party’s more moderate members to look more moderate.
I argue that the majority party leadership will open a new region to draw
status quos from, in addition to the region where status quos are drawn from
before the primary election. In the unidimensional spatial model, this means
that in addition to the status quos that the majority party leadership will
bring up from the region −∞ to |2Mmod − F |, before the general election,
they will also bring up status quos from the region |2Mmod − F | to halfway
between Mmod and F , creating an agenda with a mix of status quos from these
two regions. These are items that will promote less party line voting and
allow more moderate majority party members to defect to the minority side if
needed, without interfering with the majority party’s legislative success.
To illustrate, let’s return to our hypothetical legislator Mmod who is lo-
cated between |2Mmod − F | and F in Panel B of Figure 1. After the primary
election but before the general election, the majority party leadership recog-
nizes that for the party’s more moderate members to be reelected, they may
need to vote more moderately than the more partisan members of the ma-
jority party. For this reason, the majority party leadership will strategically
schedule a mix of status quos from the original region −∞ to |2Mmod−F | and
the new region |2Mmod − F | to halfway between Mmod and F . In the region
from |2Mmod−F | to halfway between Mmod and F , the party’s more moderate
members will vote in favor of retaining the status quo. Therefore, before the
general election, the voting behavior of Mmod and Mj will not be the same.
This allows the majority party leadership to send an informational signal
about the voting behavior of the party’s more moderate members in relation
to the party’s more partisan members. By using this mix of status quos from
the two regions, the majority party leadership gives the party’s more moderate
members the opportunity to vote in favor of the status quo (with the minority
party) and thus look more moderate. In turn, this protects the party’s more
moderate members in the general election, where their constituency’s median
voter is centered around the chamber’s median, not the party’s median.
In contrast to ideal points, which measure a legislator’s preference loca-
tion across a variety of issues on a single dimension, status quos are for a
given policy. It is atypical that the same policy has a series of observations;
rather, there is a single observation and our goal is to determine where on the
unidimensional spectrum it lies. As a single observation, it is impossible to
calculate its location in the same way we calculate ideal points for legislators,
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as it is impossible to average across time or space to estimate the location of
one observation. Therefore, because cutpoints are the closest estimate we have
to the location of the status quo, the hypothesis below focuses on the change
in cutpoints between pre/post election time periods5.
Hypothesis : In election years, there will be a larger change in the location
of bill cutpoints before and after the primary election than in non-election
years.
4 Research Design
To test the hypothesis, I use a non-equivalent two group pre/post design (Ta-
ble 1). Specifically, I make use of the difference between election years and
non-election years. This separation is logical because we would not expect
the majority party to strategically set the agenda based on election timing
in non-election years because there are no elections, nor would we expect in-
dividual legislators to change their behavior based on election timing during
non-election years.
This difference-in-difference design is especially useful because the only
difference between an election year and the previous non-election year is con-
sideration of the election. This design holds many covariates constant over
each congressional session, including individual legislators, their ideal points,
and their constituencies, thus eliminating the need for many control variables
and minimizing selection problems. Between an election year and the previ-
ous non-election year, individual legislators, the ideological distribution of the
House, and other remaining Congress-level factors are constant. It is not likely
that a legislator’s constituency changes or their ideal point changes substan-
tially. Because an election year is “matched” with the previous non-election
year, the only difference between the two years is the existence of the election
in the election year. Therefore, if the difference-in-difference results show sig-
nificant variability between election years and non-election years, this is very
likely attributable to the timing of the election.
Within this design, the treatment is the primary election and this treat-
ment is only seen in election years. Bill cutpoints are observed at two different
times for each year, before the primary election cutoff (January-August) and
after the primary election time in both election and non-election years, despite
5Cutpoints are the break between “yea” and “nay” votes on a given bill (McCarty, Poole,
and Rosenthal 2001). Given that legislators can be organized on a unidimensional space
based on their ideal points (estimated using NOMINATE), the cutpoint represents the point
at which “yea” switches to “nay” (Poole 2000, Poole and Rosenthal 1997).
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Table 1: Research Design
Pre Primary Election Post
Election Year µcutpoints X µcutpoints
Non-election Year µcutpoints µcutpoints
primary elections only occurring in the election year. I take the average lo-
cation of the cutpoints over all of the bills in each of the two periods in each
year (Table 1).
Figure 3: Cutpoint Example
I use cutpoints as the dependent variable in this analysis because the
theory and hypothesis imply that there should be larger zone of status quos
that are brought up after the primary election and before the general election
than before the primary election. To illustrate this expectation, imagine a
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hypothetical legislature with nine members (Figure 3). The majority party in
this legislature consists of members 4-9, where member 4 is a more moderate
member of the majority party. The minority party consists of members 1-
3. Panel A demonstrates the expected cutpoint of a bill that is considered
before the primary election. In this case, members 4-9 will vote in favor of
the proposal, while members 1-3 will vote against the proposal in favor of the
status quo. In this case, the majority party’s more moderate member (member
4) votes with the more partisan majority party members and their behavior /
preferences are indistinguishable. Essentially, we know that this pattern will
hold for any status quo from −∞ until |2Mmod − F |.
In contrast, Panel B shows the voting behavior of members after the
primary election but before the general election. If a status quo is considered
at the new point SQ, members 5-9 will vote in favor of the majority party’s
proposal, while members 1-4 will vote against the proposal in favor of the status
quo. Notice that in this case, the majority party’s more moderate member,
member 4, was able to vote according to their more moderate preferences
without hurting the success of the majority party. In this case, the majority
party’s more moderate member does not vote with the more partisan members
of the majority party.
Therefore, according to the hypothesis, we should expect to see a shorter
status quo zone before the primary election. This means that cutpoints will
be farther away from the majority party median before the primary election.
Alternatively, we should expect to see a larger status quo zone after the pri-
mary and before the general election, meaning that cutpoints will be closer to
the majority party median. It is the change between these two time periods
that I am interested in. In non-election years, we should expect to see no
significant change in the size of the status quo zone relative to the time the
primary election would have been if it was an election year.
I expect to see a difference in the absolute value of the location of cutpoints
before the primary and after the primary election in election years (µelection,pre
6= µelection,post). I do not expect a difference between the location of cutpoints
before the primary election time and after the primary election time in non-
election years (µnon−election,pre = µnon−election,post), because we have no reason to
believe that the majority party leadership would strategically set the agenda
based on election timing when there are no elections in that year.
To carry out this test at the vote level, I use roll-call votes from the House
of Representatives from the 88th-113th Congresses to examine the average
location of cutpoints as the dependent variable. The treatment is whether it
is an election year or not. When it is an election year, legislators want to appeal
to two different election constituencies, the primary election constituency and
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the general election constituency, and this affects the agenda. This is measured
as a dichotomous variable that denotes the time period (before the primary
(January 1st-August 30th)/ after the primary election). I compare the change
in the locations of cutpoints before and after the primary election in election
years to the change in the location of cutpoints before and after the primary
time in non-election years.
The hypothesis suggests that there is a larger difference in the location of
cutpoints before and after the primary election in election years than before
and after the primary election time in non-election years.
5 Results
I use roll-call voting data from the House of Representatives from the 88th-
113th Congresses (1963 - 2014) to examine the average location of cutpoints
at different times in a congressional session. The dataset is a combined version
of Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE roll-call data and Rohde’s PIPC
data6. I use the PIPC dataset variables to narrow down the roll-call data to
only include final passage votes7. Each row of the dataset gives information
for a final passage roll-call vote, including the number of yeas, nays, month of
vote, and first dimension cutpoint. I use the first dimension cutpoint, Mid1st,
as the dependent variable. The month variable is used to make a dichotomous
primary variable that is equal to 1 for the months January - August and 0
otherwise (September - December)8. There are a total of 3,163 observations
at the individual final passage vote level used in this analysis.
6This dataset is available from Carroll et al. (2016) here: http://voteview.com/
dwnomin.htm.
7I restrict the analysis to final passage votes because this type of vote is usually between
the status quo policy and the proposal (Robinson, Monroe, and Magleby 2017). Addition-
ally, relative to other vote types, final passage votes are more indicative of majority party
agenda-setting power (Carson, Monroe, and Robinson 2011). This match-up provides an
excellent test of the theory.
8Most of the Congressional primary elections are scheduled from January to August
(95%) (2016), but there are still some in September. This variable was coded from: http:
//www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016pdates.pdf. If August is too early, then it will be
harder to find a treatment effect when comparing cutpoints before the primary to cutpoints
of bills after the primary. From a research design standpoint, if we draw the line for the
primary election time such that half the primaries are before and half are after, this would
bias against finding an effect. Therefore, using only 95% is not a problem for the results.
A robustness check with a primary date cut-off that includes every primary election date
is included in the online Supplementary Information Appendix and does not significantly
influence the results presented in the main text. Therefore, the original primary variable
covering 95% of the primary dates is used.
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I separately code each year as an election year or a non− election year.
There are 52 years in the dataset, 26 election years and 26 non-election years.
I calculate the mean cutpoint before the primary and after the primary for
each year, regardless of election year status. These calculations yield two mean
cutpoints for each year, one before the primary and one afterwards. Next, for
a given year, I subtract the post-primary mean cutpoint from the pre-primary
mean cutpoint, which yields the difference between the mean cutpoints before
and after the primary election. The theory suggests that this difference will
be bigger in election years than in non-election years.
Because there is frequent change in who controls the House of Repre-
sentatives, I take the absolute value of the difference between the pre- and
post-primary election cutpoints. This controls for the difference in cutpoint
sign between Democratic and Republican-controlled years. Therefore, the dif-
ference represents only the average change in the location of cutpoints before
and after the primary election and does not give us any information regarding
the direction of the change9.
The absolute difference between the average cutpoints before and after
the primary election time for each year can be seen visually in Figure 410.
To test the hypothesis that in election years there will be a bigger change
in the location of cutpoints before and after the primary election than in non-
election years, I use a paired design. This means that I match one election
year with the previous non-election year and compare the difference in aver-
age cutpoint locations in each period between the two years. To do this, I
use a paired Wilcoxon signed rank test. This test is more appropriate than a
paired t-test because of the small number of observation years in this analy-
sis. Unlike a paired t-test, this test does not assume that the distribution of
cutpoints in election years and non-election years follow a normal distribution.
Using a paired design allows us to hold many covariates constant over each
congressional session, including individual legislators, their ideal points, and
their constituencies, eliminating the need for a string of control variables.
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the change in
average cutpoints before and after the primary election in election years and
9The direction of change will be the subject of investigation in future research.
10While this graph may look similar to the “sawtooth pattern” in party unity scores as
noted by CQ (http://media.cq.com/votestudies/), over the time period that I use, party
unity does not correlate well with cutpoints (ρ = −0.07). There is little reason to think that
the pattern of party unity scores exhibited over the past few decades follows the two-year
election cycle investigated in this paper. Therefore, it is not a problem for the current theory
or empirical test. The relationship between party unity scores and cutpoints is investigated
in the online Supplementary Information Appendix.
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Figure 4: Absolute Mean Cutpoint Difference by Year: Overall, there
are larger differences between pre/post mean cutpoints in election years than
non-election years.
non-election years (|µnon−election,pre−post| - |µelection,pre−post| = 0). Therefore,
the alternative hypothesis is that the difference between the average difference
in cutpoints in non-election years minus the difference in cutpoints in elec-
tion years will be less than zero (|µnon−election,pre−post| - |µelection,pre−post| < 0),
meaning that there is a larger change in election years.
The results of the Wilcoxon signed rank test are presented in Table 2. Us-
ing a two-sided test, the results hold at the p < 0.01 level (p−value = 0.004)11.
Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between
the change in average cutpoints before and after the primary election in elec-
tion years and non-election years (|µnon−election,pre−post| - |µelection,pre−post| 6= 0).
There is evidence to suggest that there is a larger difference between the change
in average cutpoints before and after the primary election in election years than
in non-election years (|µelection,pre−post| - |µnon−election,pre−post| > 0).
11Technically, I wish to test if the paired difference between non-election years and election
years is directional. Using a one-tailed test, the results still hold at the p < 0.01 level
(p− value = 0.002)
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Table 2: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Results
p-value V
Paired test of |µnon−election,pre−post| & |µelection,pre−post| 0.004∗∗∗ 66
N Years: 26 E & 26 NE Bills: 3,163
Two-tailed test. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
As noted earlier, the difference-in-difference research design accounts for
many confounding factors because the only difference between an election year
and the previous non-election year is consideration of the election. This de-
sign holds many covariates constant over each congressional session, including
individual legislators, their ideal points, and their constituencies, thus elimi-
nating the need for many control variables and minimizing selection problems.
The above test presents a clean empirical finding based on a relatively strong
research design. However, a multivariate regression approach is included in
the online Supplementary Information Appendix for robustness12.
6 Conclusion
Through the cutpoint location analysis presented in this paper, we can see that,
as the hypothesis suggests, in election years, the majority party strategically
schedules the agenda to include bills that will allow the party’s more moderate
members to exhibit voting behavior that looks identical to the party’s more
partisan members before the primary. In contrast, after the primary election in
election years, the majority party schedules a mix of bills that allow the party’s
more moderate members to exhibit voting behavior that is more moderate
than the party’s more partisan members. As a result, by strategically allowing
the majority party’s more moderate members to have opportunities to make
their preferences seem more in line with the party median before the primary
election and more in line with the floor median after the primary election, the
12The dependent variable is the absolute difference between mean cutpoints before and
after the primary election time for each year (|µyear,pre - µyear,post|). I use a dummy variable
that denotes whether or not it is an election year and a subsequent dummy variable that
represents whether a Congress precedes a presidential election (whether or not it is an
election year), as well as an interaction of the two variables. Finally, I include the change
in the number of bills from the previous year to capture the idea that the number of bills
considered in a year may affect the mean cutpoint location as well as the size of the majority
party (number of members). Overall, none of the covariates are significant predictors of the
difference in cutpoints. Arguably, this is a noisier test of the theory as there are many
differences between election years and non-election years that are not controlled for using
regression. If desired, these results can be moved to the main text.
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majority party is able to send informational signals about the characteristics of
the party’s more moderate members at a given time. The goal of this strategic
agenda setting is to help the party’s more moderate members get reelected and
thus allow the majority party to keep its majority status.
Previously, scholars have found that legislators vote with their party, even
if their party receives only marginal support in their district (Ansolabehere,
Snyder, and Stewart 2001). However, this conclusion may be due to the fact
that most previous studies pool roll-call votes together over a given Congres-
sional year without taking into consideration election timing. By considering
election timing and comparing non-election years to election years, I argue
that the majority party leadership uses their agenda-setting power strategi-
cally to give off the impression that legislators change their behavior to take
constituents’ preferences into consideration, when in reality, the majority party
leadership is changing the location of bills that are brought up in the time be-
fore and after the primary election in an election year.
These results presented here suggest that, with regard to the effects of
elections on legislative behavior, we have been thinking too narrowly. Prior
to the current study, a theory of the majority party strategically scheduling
votes to help the party’s more moderate members did not exist. This idea
does not come without substantive implications. In terms of members of the
electorate deciding who to vote for, myopic behavior in combination with this
kind of strategic information signaling by the majority party leadership could
hinder the electorate’s ability to get a clear picture of a legislator’s voting
patterns over the entire course of a year or session. In the long-run, this
could affect democracy if members of the electorate are not voting for the
correct candidates in terms of their own policy preferences or if legislators are
responding to reelection probabilities by sending informative signals and not
specifically responding to constituents’ preferences.
Future work should take into consideration the direction of the change
in cutpoints before the primary election time and after the primary election
time. The current paper suggests that the change in average cutpoint loca-
tions before and after the primary election time is larger in election years than
in non-election years. To account for changes in party control of the House of
Representatives, the absolute value of the difference is used in this analysis.
However, future work should consider the direction of change, given that a
specific party controls the House of Representatives. Additionally, this anal-
ysis could be extended to the Senate. I would expect that strategic agenda
setting based on the timing of elections would be weaker because majority
party agenda control is weaker in the Senate (Den Hartog and Monroe 2011).
Furthermore, there are fewer Senators up for reelection and therefore less of a
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signal that needs to be sent.
Future work might also investigate the effect of the size of the ideologi-
cal gap between the two party medians on strategic agenda setting based on
election timing. It might be the case that with a larger gap between the party
medians, the majority party leadership will feel the need to put increasing
effort into securing the reelection of every member and therefore prioritize
sending informational signals about the party’s more moderate members to
increase their chances of reelection. This would lead to a stronger effect of
election timing as the ideological gap increases.
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Abstract
Party labels can act as an information shortcut that helps voters more reliably guess
the issue positions of a representative, even when voters have no direct information
about their representative’s voting record. However, it can be difficult to assess
exactly how much party labels, by themselves, improve voters’ inferences about
politicians’ issue stances. This difficulty in isolating the effect of party labels arises
because people who know a politician’s party tend to also be more knowledgeable
about politics in general. As a result, a number of studies have come to mixed
conclusions about the effectiveness of heuristics (Lupia 1994; Dancey and Sheagley
2013). Here, I better isolate the effect of an individual being “treated” with knowl-
edge of a representative’s party label as a heuristic by using an instrumental variable
design. Specifically, I use living in a state with a mixed delegation to the Senate (one
Republican and one Democratic Senator) as an instrument for knowing the party
label of each Senator. I then use this instrumented measure to examine how know-
ing a Senator’s party affiliation affects a citizen’s ability to guess their Senator’s
positions on key votes. Having a mixed delegation is largely orthogonal to other
individual-level characteristics, but does affect an individual’s ability to know their
Senators’ party affiliations because they must be able to specifically pair the right
party label with each Senator (rather than simply guess it from other knowledge
about their state). Individuals living in a state with a mixed delegation are therefore
less likely to know the party label of their Senators. Using this instrumental vari-
able design, I find that knowing a Senator’s party makes voters 13.1% more likely
to correctly guess their position on major votes. This finding suggests that party
labels can independently improve citizen inference about their representatives, even
when other forms of political knowledge are held relatively constant.
Keywords: Heuristics, party label, heuristic effectiveness, decision-making
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1 Introduction
Individuals employ a variety of different heuristics to make decisions including
party label (Dancey and Sheagley 2013), group endorsements (Lupia 1994),
and source cues (Nicholson 2011). In particular, party label is generally easy
for individuals to obtain. For individuals that understand party platforms,
knowing the party label provides a large amount of information at a rela-
tively low cost. The party label can help individuals make decisions regarding
individual candidates and their policy positions, given that candidates and
representatives follow their party platform (Dancey and Sheagley 2013).
In terms of using the party label as an effective heuristic, it is hard to
isolate the effect of knowing the party label in the real world, as party affiliation
goes together with many different things used in political decision making.
For example, knowing a group endorsement is likely not the only information
that an individual has about a given policy. Individuals might also know
which party favors it, which politicians endorse it, or some idea of what kinds
of effects the policy will bring. Disentangling the effect of party label from
other heuristics is important because previous literature has come to mixed
conclusions about the effectiveness of heuristics and their ability to lead to
high quality decision making. Therefore, this paper seeks to uniquely identify
the party label as separate from other heuristics and investigate the effect of
knowing the party label on the probability of making a correct decision.
Scholars have asked if heuristics work and what the standards are by
which we should evaluate them (Lupia 1994). Do individuals who use heuris-
tics make the same decisions that they would have made if they had complete
information? Can uninformed individuals come to the same conclusions as
more informed individuals through the use of heuristics? Despite the initial
discovery that heuristics could be used to overcome lack of information (Pop-
kin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992; Lau
and Redlawsk 2006; Lupia 1994; Tversky and Kahneman 1974), further re-
search argued that heuristics might not always be useful, efficient, or lead to
the same results that full information would have led to (Kahneman 2003;
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Dancey and Sheagley 2013; Lau and Redlawsk
2001; Kuklinski and Quirk 2000).
These conflicting conclusions could be related to a number of confounds.
For instance, it might not be the case that knowing the party label biases
decision-making. Instead, it could be that those who know it are more at-
tentive to politics, stronger partisans, and more likely to engage in partisan
motivated reasoning (Green, Palmquist, and Schicker 2002; Cohen 2003; Rahn
1993; Taber and Lodge 2006). Therefore, this paper seeks to uniquely identify
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the effect of knowledge of the party label of national politicians, holding all
other things equal.
Our results show that knowing the party label is a useful cue that helps
individuals make high-quality decisions. The identification strategy rests on
a comparison between people that live in states with mixed delegations to
the Senate and people that live in states with unified delegations to the Sen-
ate. A mixed delegation is one where there is one Republican Senator and
one Democrat Senator. Mixed vs. unified delegation is orthogonal to other
individual characteristic variables, but does affect knowledge of knowing the
correct party label of a state’s representatives. I argue that for individuals
that know the party label, this increases the probability that they can cor-
rectly identify what actions their representative has taken. The primary way
that having a mixed delegation affects knowledge of how the representative
voted is that it is harder for individuals with mixed delegations to know the
party label of a given representative in their state.
The research design employed in this paper uses the 2006 Cooperative
Congressional Election Studies data for individual-level data and Senator roll-
calls on bills asked about in the survey. Using an instrumental variables ap-
proach, I separate the effect of the party label by looking at mixed state
delegations to the Senate. The idea behind this strategy is that individuals
who live in states with mixed delegations are similar to those who live in states
with unified delegations in terms of political interest, as well as other variables
related to knowledge of party labels. Because individuals in the two types of
states are similar in terms of variables related to political knowledge, compar-
ing individuals with mixed delegations to those who have unified delegations
allows for both the identification of party label alone and the construction of
a two stage model. In the first stage, I estimate the probability that an indi-
vidual knows the party label of their Senate representatives, using a dummy
variable for mixed delegation as the main independent variable. In the sec-
ond stage, I estimate the probability of an individual correctly identifying how
their representative voted, using the (first stage) probability of knowing the
correct party label of the representative as the main independent variable.
I show that individuals who live in states that have a mixed delegation to
the Senate will be less likely to know the party label of their representatives.
I then show that voters who do not know the party label are about 13%
less likely to to correctly identify how their representative in Congress voted.
This finding clarifies recent work, which shows that using the party label is
sometimes associated with biased inferences. I do not deny that this is the
case. However, I show that the average causal effect for those treated with
knowing the party label is positive. When these voters know the party label
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of their Senator, they make more accurate inferences about how their Senator
actually voted.
2 Heuristic Effectiveness
Because the cost of acquiring information is relatively high and individuals
are relatively uninformed regarding the political environment, heuristics can
be used as cognitive shortcuts (Chaiken 1980). Although widely used, previous
literature has debated the effectiveness of heuristics; specifically, their ability
to lead individuals in the right direction in terms of political decision making.
On one side, scholars have argued that heuristics are indeed effective, as
they help uninformed individuals arrive at the same conclusions as informed
individuals, without the cost of obtaining complete information about the
subject (Lupia 1994; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Kuklinski and Quirk 2000). In
terms of making correct decisions, the political environment is highly complex
and individuals are disadvantaged by their lack of information. Therefore,
individuals use heuristics to understand and form opinions about complex
issues, policies, and candidates without having complete information (Popkin
1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Page and Shapiro 1992; Brady and
Sniderman 1985; Lupia 1994). For example, studies have shown that using the
likeability heuristic, uninformed individuals can infer the policy positions of
social groups (Brady and Sniderman 1985) and make judgements based on
their fondness for the group (Nicholson 2011).
In contrast, other scholars have shown that heuristics are not an effective
way to make sense of the political environment and may not lead to correct
decisions. Previously, heuristic ineffectiveness has been attributed to political
interest (Dancey and Sheagley 2013; Lau and Redlawsk 2001), neglected in-
formation (Rahn 1993), and the idea that individuals will use any information
they have that comes to mind when making a decision, regardless of the accu-
racy of this information (Fiske and Taylor 2008). Furthermore, it is difficult
for individuals to know which pieces of information they possess are accurate
and which ones are not. Without knowing the quality of the information that
they are using, individuals can be misled by heuristics (Dancey and Sheagley
2013; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Kuklinski and Quirk 2000).
Along these same lines, Kahneman and his colleagues have shown that
heuristic use has the possibility of leading to less than optimal decisions (Kah-
neman 2003; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and Frederick 2002).
Decisions that are less than optimal are those that are not the same as what
they would have been if the individual had complete information on which to
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base their decision. In direct relation to the use of party label as a heuris-
tic, scholars have shown that ineffectiveness can stem from politicians whose
actions deviate from the ideals of their party platform (Dancey and Sheagley
2013; Ansolabehere and Jones 2010).
In observational data, it is generally hard to separate out the effect of
a particular heuristic from other knowledge that an individual has. For this
purpose, experimental studies seem more appropriate. However, it may be the
case that in a laboratory setting with fake candidates, information processing
and heuristics may work differently. Because there is no “right answer” about
how fake candidates actually voted in Congress, we cannot begin to answer the
question of whether knowing the party label leads to more accurate inferences
using a laboratory setting. Additionally, the lack of a real record means that
subjects could never have direct knowledge of how a candidate voted. This
may exaggerate the role of heuristics, since subjects are forced to use them
with fake candidates.
This paper seeks to separate out the individual effect of knowing the party
label from other possible heuristics, in the context of real-world politicians
and voting records. Unfortunately, individuals who know one thing about
politics, such as the party label of a politician, tend to know other things about
politics as well (Huckfeldt et al. 1999). This leads to a general inability to
estimate the effect of the party label on its own, without interference from other
heuristics that individuals use to make political decisions. By using a unique
instrumental variable approach, I show that individuals in states with a mixed
delegation are not significantly different in terms of political interest level from
individuals who live in states with a unified delegation. However, living in a
mixed delegation state affects the probability of an individual knowing the
party label of their representatives. If the party label is known, I argue that
it has a positive effect on an individual’s ability to correctly identify the votes
of their representatives.
3 Theory
On its own, when used as a heuristic, the party label is a beneficial tool
that individuals can use to make up for incomplete information. I assume
that individuals do in fact use the party label as information when making a
political decision when they have it available to them. The effectiveness of the
party label is conditional on the amount of information that can be gained
from knowing it. This means that as the information level of the party label
increases, using the party label as a heuristic will become more effective. In
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contrast, if the party label is uninformative, even when it is known and used, it
will not be an effective decision-making tool if accuracy is the goal. Therefore,
I assume that the party label is an informative heuristic.
The main goal of this paper is to separate out the individual effect of
knowing the party label. Because I am looking at the effect of knowledge on
decision-making, I assume that there are no significant differences between
the knowledge level of individuals in mixed vs. unified delegation states while
controlling for other pre-treatment covariates that could be thought to affect
this relationship. Assuming that there are no significant differences in polit-
ical knowledge between the two types of delegations means that on average,
individuals in California (D-D) look relatively similar to individuals in Indiana
(R-D) in terms of level of political knowledge. This is the key to separating
out the effect of the party label. I assume that mixed versus unified delegation
status is orthogonal to individual characteristics, but it does affect individuals’
ability to know the party label of their representatives.
Knowing the party label is a useful cue that helps individuals make ac-
curate decisions. The institutional characteristic of mixed versus unified dele-
gations helps to separate out the effect of the party label on its own. I argue
that having a mixed delegation affects both the ability to know the party la-
bel of the state’s representatives and therefore, the ability to know how the
representatives vote.
The effectiveness of using the party label as a heuristic also depends on
an individual’s knowledge of the ideological placement of the major parties. If
an individual does not have knowledge of which party is on the left, knowing
the party label of their state’s representatives will not be very helpful. In
contrast, for individuals that do know which party is on the left, knowing the
party label should be highly beneficial, given that representatives are behaving
according to their party’s platform. Therefore, the negative effect of living in
a mixed delegation will be the highest for people who can place the parties on
the ideological scale. Individuals who know party placement but live in a state
with a mixed delegation will have a harder time knowing which representative
is from which party and therefore, will be less likely to correctly identify their
representatives’ votes. Alternatively, individuals that know the placement of
the parties and live in a state with a unified delegation will be more likely to
know the party label of their representatives and be able to put it to good
use. For individuals that do not know the placement of the parties, living in
a mixed delegation should have no effect on the ability to correctly identify
votes, due to the fact that these individuals do not derive information from
the party label.
Individuals who live in states with a mixed delegation are less likely to
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know the party label of their representatives than individuals that live in states
with a unified delegation. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis : Individuals who know the party label of their representatives
will be more likely to correctly classify the votes of their representatives than
people who do not know the party label of their representatives.
4 Research Design
To test this theory, I employ an instrumental variable design using data
from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study1. Additionally, I
merged hand-coded data on each state’s Senate delegation onto the 2006 CCES
dataset. The unit of analysis is individual bill-level voting data, where each
state has two Senators who vote on proposed bills. Individuals are asked to
identify the party label as well as the votes of their Senators on seven indi-
vidual bills ranging from abortion to capital gains to the Iraq War. The data
was converted to long form, meaning that each individual has 14 observations
(7 bills for each Senator). The seven bills are analyzed separately, meaning
that each individual has the opportunity to correctly guess 14 different votes
between their two Senators2.
To separate out the effects of knowing the party label, I use an instrumen-
tal variable approach. The instrument is a binary indicator of living in a state
with a mixed (1) or unified (0) delegation to the Senate. The treatment is
knowledge of the party label of the state’s Senators and the outcome is correct
identification of a Senator’s vote on a bill. As shown in Figure 13, the binary
indicator Z affects the outcome Y, correct identification of votes, through the
treatment X, knowing the party label of the Senator.
Additionally, Z has additional associations with Y that are blocked by
conditioning on the observed pre-treatment covariates, W. The observed pre-
treatment covariates include the respondent’s political interest level, age, gen-
der, income, and ethnicity. In using this research design, I am not claiming
that there are zero potential confounds between living in a mixed delegation
and knowing the votes of a Senator. Instead, I am assuming that the num-
ber of plausible confounds becomes highly limited and can be controlled for.
1Data from the 2006 CCES was obtained from http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/
cces/home.
2Unfortunately, this type of question where respondents are asked about the votes of their
representatives is not available over multiple years. Therefore, this analysis only includes
data from the 2006 CCES.
3Adapted from Morgan and Winship (2009).
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Figure 1: Causal Diagram: The instrumental variable, Z (a binary variable
indicating mixed or unified delegation), affects the outcome Y, correct iden-
tification of votes, through the treatment X, knowing the party label of the
Senator. Z has additional associations with Y that are blocked by condition-
ing on the observed pre-treatment covariates, W. In this case, Z is a valid
conditional instrumental variable.
Figure 1 illustrates this argument in the following way: The instrument (Z)
may have additional associations with our dependent variable (Y). These are
represented by W in the figure above. However, we can block these additional
associations by conditioning on them in both the first and second stage re-
gressions. For example, there is a risk that Senators from mixed delegations
vote with their party less consistently, and this independently makes it harder
for voters to guess their position (whether or not a voter knows the party la-
bel). We can block this path by controlling for how often a Senator votes with
their party (party unity score). If we control for these types of pre-treatment
confounds, then Z is a valid conditional instrumental variable (Morgan and
Winship 2009).
In the first stage, I investigate the effect an individual of living in a state
with a mixed delegation on their ability to know the party label of their Sen-
ators, controlling for pre-treatment covariates. The first stage regression is
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estimated using the following formula:
KnowPartyLabel = α + β1mixedi + β2polinteresti + β3agei+
β4genderi+β5incomei+β6whiterespi+β7SenPartyj+β8PartyUnityScorej+ui
(1)
The index i indicates respondent-level characteristics, while index j indi-
cates Senator-level characteristics. KnowPartyLabel is a binary indicator of
knowing a given Senator’s party label (1) or not (0). Although the theory as-
sumes that individuals in states with mixed versus unified delegations are not
significantly different in terms of political knowledge, due to lack of inclusion
in the 2006 CCES, political interest is used as a proxy for political knowledge.
There is no reason to believe that political knowledge and political interest
would have significantly different effects on heuristic use. In fact, political
knowledge questions may come too close to measuring knowledge of the party
label, so political interest may actually be preferred in this case. Polinterest
is a trichotomous measure with higher numbers representing more political
interest. Age is the respondent’s age at the time of the survey. Gender is a
binary indicator that is equal to 1 if the respondent is female and 0 other-
wise. Income is coded on a 14-point scale, with higher numbers representing
a higher income level. Ethnicity is measured with whiteresp, which is coded
1 if the respondent is white and 0 otherwise. Because the party platform of
one party might be easier to predict than the other, I control for the Senator’s
party (SenParty). Finally, to control for the effectiveness / ineffectiveness of
the party label to convey accurate information, I use party unity scores as a
measure of how often a given Senator votes with their party4.
In the second stage, I use the estimated probability of knowing the Sen-
ator’s party label (from the first stage) as the main independent variable. I
investigate the effect of knowing the party label on the ability to correctly
identify the Senator’s vote on a given bill. The second stage regression is
estimated using the following formula:
CorrectV ote = pi+δ1KnowPartyLabeli+δ2polinteresti+δ3agei+δ4genderi+
δ5incomei + δ6whiteresp+ δ7SenPartyj + δ8PartyUnityScorej + vi (2)
Correct V ote is a binary indicator that is equal to 1 if the respondent
correctly identified their Senator’s vote on a given bill and 0 otherwise. The
idea behind this instrumental variable research design is that, as will be shown
4Party unity scores were obtained from https://legacy.voteview.com/Party_Unity.
htm.
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below, individuals in states with mixed versus unified delegations are not sig-
nificantly different in terms of political interest. Therefore, the only relevant
difference should be the fact that some individuals are living in a state with
a mixed delegation to the Senate and others are not. Because individuals are
otherwise similar, comparing individuals with mixed delegations to those who
have unified delegations allows for both the identification of party label alone
and construction of a two stage model. I argue that living in a state with a
mixed delegation makes it more difficult for individuals to be able to correctly
identify the partly label of their Senators. However, knowing the party label
should make it easier to correctly identify the votes of their Senators.
5 Empirical Analysis
Before presenting results from the instrumental variable regression5, I first
test the assumption that there is not a significant difference in the political
interest level (as a proxy for political knowledge) between individuals who
live in states with mixed delegations versus unified delegations. To do this, I
find the group mean for political interest for mixed and unified states. The
mean political interest level of individuals in mixed states is 2.81, while the
mean political interest level of individuals in unified states is 2.80. A t-test of
the difference between these means yields a two-tailed p-value of 0.55, which
suggests that there is indeed no significant difference between the political
interest level of individuals in states with mixed versus unified delegations.
Therefore, this allows for the assertion that the only relevant difference between
individuals who live in states with mixed versus unified delegations is the
delegation composition itself.
In the first stage of the instrumental variable regression, I investigate the
effects of living in a state with a mixed delegation on the ability to correctly
know the party label of a Senator. The theory assumes that individuals who
live in states with mixed delegations will be less likely to correctly identify the
party label of their Senators compared to individuals who live in states with
unified delegations. This is exactly what I find in the first-stage estimates,
shown in Table 1 below using Equation (1). Remember that each individ-
ual has the opportunity to correctly identify the party label of two Senators,
individually, meaning that there are fourteen observations per respondent.
Because the effectiveness of the party label as a heuristic depends on an
5I use a normal instrumental variables 2SLS model here for ease of interpretation, but
more appropriate bivariate probit results are presented in the Appendix. There are no
substantive differences between the results of the two models.
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Table 1: Instrumental Variable 2SLS Estimates (First Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(All) (All) (Know Place) (Know Place) (DNK Place) (DNK Place)
KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel
Mixed Delegation -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
Political Interest 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Age 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender -0.05∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Income 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
White Resp. 0.02∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Senator Party -0.01 -0.01∗ -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Party Unity Score -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
cons 0.95∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.11)
N 102242 59864 71456 41972 30786 17892
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
individual being able to derive information from the party label, I compute
three separate instrumental variable models. In the first column of Table 1, all
respondents in the CCES are used, regardless of their ability to place the par-
ties on the ideological scale. Overall, the estimates in the first column suggest
that living in a state with a mixed delegation decreases the likelihood of know-
ing the party label of the Senator, and this effect is significant at the p < 0.001
level. Changing from a unified delegation to a mixed delegation decreases the
probability that an individual knows the party label of their Senator by 0.01.
With the addition of covariates in Column 2, we see that political interest,
age, gender, income, and ethnicity are also significant predictors of knowing
the party label of their Senator. Therefore, I include these variables as controls
to investigate the robustness of the mixed delegation effect, however, there is
no reason to believe that the covariates have a significant effect for one group
(mixed vs. unified) over the other. With the inclusion of covariates in Column
2, the effect remains negative and significant (p < 0.05).
In the third and fourth columns, I narrow the analysis to only individuals
who can correctly place the parties on the ideological left-right scale. As
proposed in the theory above, the negative effect of living in a state with
a mixed delegation should be most pronounced for those that are able to
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correctly place the parties. The estimates in Column 3 suggest that individuals
who know the placement of the parties are significantly less likely to be able
to correctly identify the party label of their Senators when they live in states
with mixed delegations (p < 0.001). With the inclusion of the covariates, the
negative effect of living in a state with a mixed delegation remains significant
(p < 0.05). Changing from a unified to a mixed delegation yields a decrease in
the probability of an individual knowing their Senator’s party label by 0.02.
The fifth and sixth columns present the effect of living in a state with a
mixed delegation for individuals who are not able to correctly place the parties
on the left right scale (roughly 30% of the sample). The estimate in Column
6 suggests that there is not a significant effect of living in a mixed delegation
state on these individuals’ ability to correctly identify the party label of their
Senators. This is logical because individuals who are not able to place the
parties on the left-right scale are probably also not likely to know the party
label to begin with, regardless of which kind of state they live in.
Overall, Table 1 provides evidence to conclude that the effect of living
in a state with a mixed delegation on individuals’ ability to correctly identify
the party label of their Senators is robustly negative and significant only for
individuals that are able to correctly place the parties on the left-right scale.
In the second stage, I use the estimates of knowing the partly label from
the first stage regression as the main independent variable. The second stage
investigates the effect of knowing the party label on individuals’ ability to
correctly identify a Senator’s vote on a given bill. Recall that the hypothesis
suggests that individuals who know the party label of their representatives
will be more likely to be able to correctly classify the votes of their represen-
tatives than people who do not know the party label of their representatives.
Using Equation (2), I compute the second-stage estimates of the instrumental
variables regression, which are presented below in Table 2.
Columns 1 and 2 analyze the effects of knowing the party label of the
Senator on ability to correctly identify their votes for all individuals. Column
1 is the effect of knowing the party label without the inclusion of any of the
covariates. The effect of knowing the party label on correct identification
of votes is positive and significant (p < 0.05). This effect is not attenuated
when the pre-treatment covariates are added back into the regression (Column
2). In this case, there is still a positive and significant effect of knowing the
party label on ability to correctly identify votes (p < 0.05). For individuals
treated with the partly label (going from not knowing to knowing), ability
to correctly identify the vote of the Senator increases by 3.21. Using these
results, knowing a Senator’s party makes voters 13.1% more likely to correctly
39
Table 2: Instrumental Variable 2SLS Estimates (Second Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(All) (All) (Know Place) (Know Place) (DNK Place) (DNK Place)
correct correct correct correct correct correct
Know Party Label 4.79∗ 3.21∗ 5.28∗ 3.12∗ 3.19 2.98
(2.17) (1.43) (2.69) (1.35) (2.54) (3.72)
Political Interest -0.33 -0.25 -0.45
(0.18) (0.14) (0.66)
Age -0.00∗ -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Gender 0.13 0.14 0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.14)
Income -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
White Resp. -0.04 -0.05 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Senator Party 0.03 0.02 0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Party Unity Score 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
cons -3.73 -1.61∗ -4.24 -1.86∗ -2.18 -1.09
(2.06) (0.75) (2.57) (0.87) (2.36) (1.25)
N 98921 57945 69155 40586 29766 17359
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
guess their position on major votes6.
The third and fourth columns show the effects of knowing the party label
on ability to correctly identify Senators’ votes for only individuals who can
correctly place the parties on the left-right scale. The results are similar to
those in Columns 1 and 2. Knowing the party label of the Senator has a posi-
tive and significant effect on ability to correctly classify their votes (p < 0.05).
This effect is not attenuated by the inclusion of the pre-treatment covariates,
as the effect of knowing the party label is still positive and significant at the
p < 0.05 level. By treating individuals who are able to correctly place the par-
ties on the left-right scale with the party label of their Senator, the probability
6This calculation is done using the bivariate probit model (included in the appendix)
which has the same substantive results but is more accurate, given the binary treatment
and outcome variables.
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of correctly identifying their votes increases by 3.12. For individuals who know
the placement of the parties, the effect of knowing a Senator’s party on their
ability to correctly guess the Senator’s position on votes increases from 13.1%
(everyone) to 17.1%.
Columns 5 and 6 display the effects of knowing the party label of their
Senator on ability to correctly identify their votes for only individuals who
are not able to correctly place the parties on the left-right scale. Column 5
shows that the effect of knowing the party label on its own for individuals
who are unable to place the parties is not significant. When the pre-treatment
covariates are added back into the regression in Column 6, knowing the party
label is still not a significant predictor of correctly identifying Senators’ votes,
just as expected. It would not make sense for there to be a positive effect
of knowing the party label on correct identification of votes for individuals
who do not know the placement of the parties because they are unable to
derive party platform information from knowing the party label. While the
magnitude of the coefficients for knowing the party label are relatively similar
between the “know” and “don’t know” voters, the standard errors are much
larger for “don’t know” voters, beyond what we would expect from the sample
size alone, suggesting that any possible effect for “don’t know” voters would be
more variable and inconsistent. For individuals that cannot place the parties,
knowing a Senator’s party does not have a significant effect on their ability to
correctly guess positions on major votes.
Therefore, the hypothesis is supported for only individuals who are able to
place the parties on the left-right scale. Individuals who know the placement
of the parties can benefit from knowing the party label, as it allows them to
use party label as an informational heuristic to help them correctly identify
the votes of their Senators. Returning back to the assumption that the party
label is an informative heuristic, we can see that this is indeed the case - the
party label is an informative heuristic for people that can derive information
from it (individuals that can correctly place the parties on the left-right scale).
5.1 States that Switch Often
It may be the case that states such as California, that almost never switch from
a unified delegation to a mixed delegation (or the reverse), heavily influence the
probability of an individual knowing the party label. To counter this argument,
a robustness check was conducted with a subset of states that switched their
delegation type 2-5 times over seven elections. The results from the first stage
are substantively similar to the original analysis. The second stage results are
presented below in Table 3. The results are substantively similar to the full
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dataset including all of the states, meaning that for individuals that reside
in states that switch their delegation type often, living in a mixed delegation
decreases the probability of knowing the party label. However, when the party
label is known, individuals are more likely to correctly guess the votes of their
representatives in Congress (p < 0.01).
Table 3: Instrumental Variables 2SLS Estimates (Second Stage, States that
Switch Often)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(All) (All) (Know Place) (Know Place) (DNK Place) (DNK Place)
correct correct correct correct correct correct
Know Party Label 1.81∗ 0.95∗∗ 1.97∗ 0.86∗∗ 1.33 1.08
(0.76) (0.32) (0.87) (0.30) (1.26) (0.96)
Political Interest -0.07 -0.06 -0.10
(0.04) (0.04) (0.15)
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender 0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Income Level -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
White Resp. -0.02 -0.01 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Senator Party 0.03∗∗ 0.01 0.06∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Party Unity Score 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
cons -0.92 -0.57∗∗∗ -1.07 -0.59∗∗∗ -0.48 -0.48∗
(0.71) (0.14) (0.83) (0.16) (1.17) (0.24)
N 35327 24342 24714 16841 10613 7501
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
6 Discussion & Conclusion
Previous research highlighted the possible association between using the party
label as a heuristic and biased inferences as a consequence. However, as I
illustrate here using a unique identification strategy, the average causal effect
of the party label is that it improves inference. Individuals who know the
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party label of their Senator are more likely to make accurate inferences about
how their Senator actually voted.
I argue that heuristics can be effective informational tools that individ-
uals can use to make high-quality decisions. Using an instrumental variable
approach, I find support for the hypothesis that knowing the party label im-
proves inference, but this support is conditional on the ability to derive infor-
mation from the party label itself. While the informational level of the party
label is variable year to year and even bill to bill (Nail 2019), it is also the
case that some individuals are better suited to make use of the party label
than others. Individuals who are not able to correctly place the parties on the
left-right scale are unable to make use of the party label as a heuristic even
if they know it. This is due to the fact that they cannot derive information
from the party label about which platform each label represents. Individuals
who cannot place the parties on the left-right scale are not affected by living
in states with a mixed delegation to the Senate - they are neither less likely
to know the party label of their Senator nor more likely to correctly identify
the votes of their senators.
In contrast, individuals who are able to place the parties on the left-right
scale can gain a significant predictive advantage by using the party label as a
heuristic. For individuals who know the correct placement of the parties, living
in a state with a mixed delegation significantly decreases their likelihood of
knowing the party label of their Senators. However, individuals who are able
to place the parties on the left-right scale and also know the party label of their
representatives are significantly more likely to be able to correctly identify the
votes of their Senators. The party label is only an effective heuristic when
individuals can gain information from it and when this information can be
used to make correct decisions. By knowing the placement of the parties and
the party label of a politician, individuals are significantly more likely to be
able to correctly predict how their politicians are voting.
This paper has shown that there are instances where heuristics are more
effective than others. In this case, party label is an effective heuristic when
individuals can derive information from the party label itself. This enables in-
dividuals to make high quality decisions with little information. Additionally,
there are times when the party label is more informative than others, such
as when the two parties are divided over a certain issue (Nail 2019). If the
accuracy of heuristics is variable, this has consequences for uninformed indi-
viduals who use heuristics to make up for incomplete information and close
the information gap between themselves and informed individuals.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Bivariate Probit Models
In the main part of the paper, I include two stage least squares instrumental
variables regressions for ease of interpretation. Included below are the bivariate
probit models due to the binary instrument and binary outcome variable. The
results from the tables below are substantively similar to the 2SLS models
used in the paper.
Table 4: Instrumental Variables Bivariate Probit Estimates (First Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(All) (All) (Know Place) (Know Place) (DNK Place) (DNK Place)
KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel correct KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel
Mixed Delegation -0.15∗∗ -0.19∗∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.26∗∗ -0.13 -0.11
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Political Interest 0.68∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Age 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender -0.40∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.21∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
Income Level 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
White Resp. 0.14∗ 0.21∗∗ -0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09)
Senator Party -0.09 -0.13∗ -0.00
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Party Unity Score -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
cons 1.64∗∗∗ -0.85∗ 1.72∗∗∗ -0.31 1.49∗∗∗ -1.57∗∗
(0.02) (0.35) (0.03) (0.47) (0.04) (0.54)
athrho
cons -0.71∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.78∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.56∗∗∗ 0.24
(0.10) (0.07) (0.16) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13)
N 98921 67290 69155 46719 29766 20571
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
8.2 Results by Bill
In this section, I check the effects of mixed delegation by bill for each of
the seven bills that are included on the 2006 CCES. The results are largely
consistent, as knowing the party label of their senator makes an individual
more likely to correctly guess their position on a bill for five of the seven bills.
46
Table 5: Instrumental Variables Bivariate Probit Estimates (Second Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(All) (All) (Know Place) (Know Place) (DNK Place) (DNK Place)
correct correct correct correct correct correct
Know Party Label 1.99∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 2.13∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ 0.10
(0.14) (0.13) (0.20) (0.16) (0.20) (0.24)
Political Interest 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender -0.08∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Income Level 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
White Resp. 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Senator Party 0.00 -0.08∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Party Unity Score 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
cons -1.07∗∗∗ -2.40∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗ -2.39∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗ -2.52∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.20) (0.16) (0.19) (0.18)
athrho
cons -0.71∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.78∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.56∗∗∗ 0.24
(0.10) (0.07) (0.16) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13)
N 98921 67290 69155 46719 29766 20571
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
8.3 States that Switch
In this section, I provide the first stage results from the 2SLS instrumental
variables regression using states that switch 2-5 times over 7 elections. The
second stage results are presented in Table 3 in the main text. Additionally,
I provide bivariate probit models. Both versions are substantively similar to
the 2SLS results presented in Table 3.
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Table 6: Results by Bill for Both Senators and All Respondents (Bivariate
Probit Model First Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel
Mixed Delegation -0.15 -0.17∗ -0.18∗ -0.15∗ -0.16∗ -0.14 -0.18∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Political Interest 0.65∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Age 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender -0.44∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Income Level 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
White Resp. 0.11 0.14∗ 0.13∗ 0.13∗ 0.13∗ 0.14∗ 0.14∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Senator Party -0.01 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Party Unity Score -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
cons -0.70 -0.79 -0.71 -0.79∗ -0.84∗ -1.10∗ -0.85∗
(0.45) (0.42) (0.43) (0.40) (0.42) (0.49) (0.42)
athrho
cons -0.07 0.08 -0.13 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.08
(0.17) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
N 7408 8503 8517 8418 8419 8304 8376
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Results by Bill for Both Senators and All Respondents (Bivariate
Probit Model Second Stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
correct correct correct correct correct correct correct
Know Party Label 0.81∗ 0.46∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.11 0.61∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.09
(0.34) (0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.25)
Political Interest 0.11 0.23∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.11∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Age -0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗ 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender -0.06 -0.08∗ -0.08 -0.06 -0.15∗∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.10∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Income Level 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
White Resp. 0.15∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.16∗∗ 0.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Senator Party 0.58∗∗∗ -0.95∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Party Unity Score 0.03∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.00 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
cons -4.10∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ -4.64∗∗∗ 0.69∗ -2.40∗∗∗ -5.33∗∗∗ -2.67∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.28) (0.30) (0.27) (0.31) (0.35) (0.26)
athrho
cons -0.07 0.08 -0.13 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.08
(0.17) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
N 7408 8503 8517 8418 8419 8304 8376
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Instrumental Variable 2SLS Estimates (First Stage, States that
Switch Often)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(All) (All) (Know Place) (Know Place) (DNK Place) (DNK Place)
KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel
Mixed Delegation -0.02∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Political Interest 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender -0.05∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.04∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Income Level 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
White Resp. 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Senator Party -0.00 -0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Party Unity Score 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
cons 0.95∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.20
(0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.15)
N 36778 25242 25676 17500 11102 7742
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 9: Instrumental Variable Bivariate Probit Estimates (First Stage, State
that Switch Often)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(All) (All) (Know Place) (Know Place) (DNK Place) (DNK Place)
KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel correct KnowPartyLabel KnowPartyLabel
Mixed Delegation -0.18∗ -0.31∗∗ -0.22∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.14 -0.16
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15)
Political Interest 0.70∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.12)
Age 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender -0.41∗∗∗ -0.49∗∗∗ -0.28∗
(0.08) (0.10) (0.14)
Income Level 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
White Resp. 0.30∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.23
(0.09) (0.11) (0.15)
Senator Party -0.02 -0.07 0.14
(0.08) (0.09) (0.13)
Party Unity Score 0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cons 1.61∗∗∗ -1.59∗∗ 1.67∗∗∗ -1.02 1.50∗∗∗ -2.57∗∗
(0.04) (0.55) (0.05) (0.68) (0.06) (0.87)
athrho
cons -0.40∗∗ 0.10 -0.57∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.39
(0.13) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.35) (0.23)
N 35327 24342 24714 16841 10613 7501
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
51
Table 10: Instrumental Variable Bivariate Probit Estimates (Second Stage,
States that Switch Often)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(All) (All) (Know Place) (Know Place) (DNK Place) (DNK Place)
correct correct correct correct correct correct
Knowledge Party Label 1.48∗∗∗ 0.42∗ 1.75∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.69 -0.10
(0.22) (0.20) (0.24) (0.21) (0.71) (0.40)
Political Interest 0.12∗∗ 0.09 0.23∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gender -0.07∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Income Level 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
White Resp. 0.06∗ 0.07 0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Senator Party 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02 0.27∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Party Unity Score 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
cons -0.65∗∗ -2.51∗∗∗ -0.89∗∗∗ -2.60∗∗∗ 0.05 -2.51∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.16) (0.24) (0.21) (0.65) (0.24)
athrho
cons -0.40∗∗ 0.10 -0.57∗∗∗ 0.01 0.02 0.39
(0.13) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.35) (0.23)
N 35327 24342 24714 16841 10613 7501
Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Abstract
Over the past four decades, technology has decreased the cost of acquiring
information. Despite this pattern, there is not a clear indication that people
have become more knowledgeable about their representatives in government
on many dimensions. In fact, there is even some evidence that people are now
less knowledgeable about some facts – such as the names of their Congress
members (Jacobson 2015). I argue that cheaper information has not increased
voters’ knowledge about individual candidates because voters possess an even
cheaper and increasingly informative cue: party id. As parties have become
more ideologically distinct, voters have been increasingly able to guess how
any given representative voted on a salient bill. Therefore, individuals should
be less likely to seek out specific information about what individual legislators
do in Congress. I test this hypothesis using a decision-theoretic experiment.
In the experiment, participants try to guess how a candidate voted on a partic-
ular bill for a monetary reward, and may pay to acquire an informative signal
before guessing. This is analogous to investing effort in learning facts about
a candidate’s record, which is costly. I find that participants that have the
party label available to them are indeed less willing to pay for an informative
signal when it becomes easier to guess a candidate’s vote based on their party
id. From 1970-2008, individuals’ willingness to pay for more information when
they have the party label has decreased by 30%.
Keywords: Information theory, decision-theoretic experiment, willingness to
pay
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1 Introduction
Over the past four decades, access to information has become much
cheaper. Through internet search engines such as Google, individuals can
ask questions and receive simultaneous answers. Despite this pattern, there is
not a clear indication that people have more direct knowledge about how their
representatives have voted in Congress1. In fact, there is evidence that people
are now less likely to know specific facts about their Congress members than
in the past (Jacobson 2015). For example, voters are less likely to know their
representative’s name than they were in the past (Jacobson 2015).
In this paper, I argue that cheaper information has not increased voters’
knowledge about individual candidates because voters possess an even cheaper
and increasingly informative cue: party id. Complex political environments
have encouraged the use of heuristics such as the party label.
Building on this idea, I experimentally test the effect of varying the level
of information conveyed by party brands. In particular, I test whether in-
creasing levels of information conveyed by party brands has caused voters to
invest less in learning about their representatives’ individual records. I test
this conjecture using a decision-theoretic experiment varying the amount of
information that a candidate’s party label conveys about how that candidate
voted2. In the experiment, participants try to guess how a candidate voted on
a particular bill for a monetary reward, and may pay to receive an informa-
tive signal before guessing. This payment is analogous to investing effort in
learning facts about a candidate’s record, which is costly. I hypothesize that
participants with the party label available to them will be less willing to pay
for an informative signal when it is easier to guess a candidate’s vote based on
their party id.
1Direct knowledge is knowledge about an individual representative, such as their issue
positions, voting history, or even their name. In contrast, indirect knowledge is knowledge
inferred about individual representatives using other information – such as guessing how a
representative voted based on their party label.
2This paper builds on a previous paper (as well as a poster that was presented at PolMeth
2017), and investigates the effect of varying the level of information conveyed by party
brands. In “The Informational Value of Party Labels and Legislator Voting Records,” I
show that the information conveyed by a party’s record has increased over time. In the
current paper, I test whether this has caused voters to invest less in learning about their
representatives’ individual records.
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2 Party Label Informativeness and Willing-
ness to Pay
Early work on voting behavior in the 1950s and 60s found that voters
often knew very little about where candidates or their parties stood on a host
of salient issues. Individuals were found to have neither a clear set of beliefs
nor understand politics at an acceptable level (Converse 1964; Campbell et al.
1960). This may be fundamentally detrimental for democratic accountability.
If individuals are not aware of where parties stand on issues or how their rep-
resentatives vote in Congress, they are not able to determine if their interests
are being represented and are unable to hold their representatives accountable
for their actions.
However, voters’ knowledge about politics has alsochanged substantially
over the last 6 decades. For example, voters are now much more likely to know
where the parties and their candidates stand on a host of issues (Hetherington
2001; Levendusky 2010). In fact, voters who pay very little attention to politics
know as much about the differences between the party’s positions as voters
who paid a lot of attention to politics in the 1970s (Smidt 2017). Relatedly,
work by Dancey and Sheagley (2013) finds that many voters can guess how
their senator voted on a number of salient bills. Importantly, however, these
changes in voter knowledge are largely being driven by what voters know about
the parties, rather than an increase in voters’ direct knowledge of candidates’
own votes. For example, Dancey and Sheagley (2013) show that while citizens
can often guess how their senator voted, they almost always get it wrong
in the cases where their representative’s vote diverges from the majority of
the representative’s party. Similarly, Warshaw and Tausonovitch (2018) show
that voters are largely unable to distinguish how members of Congress from
the same party differ ideologically.
Consistent with these findings, other scholars have found evidence that
voters increasingly evaluate candidates based on their party affiliations, rather
than their individual records (Rahn 1993; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Popkin
1994; Snyder and Ting 2003; Bonica and Cox 2017; Kim and LeVeck 2013).
Additionally, voters may actually know a smaller number of facts about their
individual representatives than they did in the past. One example of this
phenomenon is that voters are now less likely to know the names of their Con-
gressional representatives (Jacobson 2015). This second finding is particularly
interesting, given the fact that the rise of and popularity of the internet has
made it much easier for individuals to find this type of factual information
– and at a fairly low cost compared to past decades. Similarly, it should be
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fairly easy to learn about how an individual’s own representatives voted on a
specific bill, but the vast majority of voters do not seem to posses this type
of direct knowledge about their incumbents, even for salient bills (Dancey
and Sheagley 2013; Ansolabehere and Jones 2010). By increasingly evaluating
candidates based on their party instead of their individual records, this may
signal a shift in the level of accountability in American politics from individual
representatives to parties as a whole.
However, it is still an open question as to why this shift to “party-centric”
voting has occurred. One prominent explanation is that the difference in what
individuals know and how they vote is actually being driven by changes in how
the parties behave in Congress. Votes made by legislators in Congress have
become increasingly polarized (Poole, Rosenthal, and Koford 1991; McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 1991; Poole and Rosenthal
1997; Poole and Rosenthal 2011). In addition, legislators have also increas-
ingly taken more extreme party positions (Bafumi and Herron 2010; Fiorina,
Abrams, and Pope 2006; Clinton 2006). Over time, as the parties in Congress
have polarized, meaning that they have become more ideologically distinct,
the party label itself has become a more informative cue to voters (Dancey
and Sheagley 2013; Kim and LeVeck 2013; Grynaviski 2006; Smidt 2017).
With a polarized Congress, there are now greater differences between how the
members of each party vote, in addition to greater homogeneity within each
party. This makes it such that if you know how a candidate’s party voted on
an issue, you probably also have a very good idea about how that individual
candidate voted as well. Therefore, because the party label of a candidate
is relatively cheap to acquire and has become increasingly informative, voters
may increasingly focus on a candidate’s party label instead of other informa-
tion.
This explanation is appealing, both because it is intuitive, and because
increases in polarization strongly correlate with increases in what voters know
about the parties (Smidt 2017). However, we cannot say for certain that this
correlation means that the information contained in increasingly polarized
party records is actually causing party-centric knowledge and voting among
voters3. Also, even if the relationship is causal, we still lack evidence to show
how strong the causal relationship is.
Evidence in support of this claim that more informative party labels
3For example, one potential confounder is illustrated by McCarty, Poole, and Rosen-
thal (2006), who argued that polarization in Congress has been driven by fundamental
demographic changes in the electorate, such as economic inequality and increased levels of
immigration. These types of demographic changes could certainly also affect changes in
voters’ knowledge and behavior in addition to Congressional polarization.
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have caused more party-centric voting has historically been difficult to obtain,
mainly because we lack a control group containing voters who lack access to
the increasingly informative party brands at multiple points in U.S. history.
Without this comparison, and especially with observational data, it is impos-
sible to determine causality, leaving us with only the ability to determine the
possible correlation between party-centric voting and the increasing informa-
tiveness of party records.
Here, I address this difficulty by using a measure that quantifies the
amount of information that is contained in party records about how indi-
vidual candidates vote. This measure is abstract and can be applied to many
environments, including decision-theoretic experiments, where the amount of
information available to subjects equals the amount of information that is
conveyed by party brands at different points in history. Using an experiment
in which I vary the amount of information conveyed by the party label to
march the information environment at various points in time, I formally test
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: As party labels become more informative about how indi-
vidual candidates will vote, citizens will be less willing to invest costly effort
in learning about how the candidate actually voted.
3 Measurement
To test this hypothesis, we first need a measure that quantifies how much
information is conveyed by the party label while simultaneously describing
how distinct the party brands are from each other at a given point in time.
Information is defined here as a reduction in uncertainty. This means that the
more information that is available, the more uncertainty is reduced. Here, we
are interested in reducing uncertainty about how incumbents vote in Congress.
Therefore, the more information that is contained in the party label, the more
uncertainty about how incumbents will vote is reduced.
This concept can be applied to how people vote ideologically by using
the Jensen-Shannon Divergence (Lin 1991). The Jensen-Shannon Divergence
(JSD) uses entropy (H), which is a measure of uncertainty, to characterize
how much uncertainty is reduced if we know which distribution is generating
a given set of data4. In this case, the distributions are the parties in Congress
(Republican, Democrat) and we can quantify the amount of uncertainty about
4See appendix for a more detailed characterization of the Jensen-Shannon Divergence
(JSD), as well as its mathematical details.
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ideological voting records that is reduced or eliminated when we go from not
knowing an incumbent’s party label to knowing their party label.
To do this, I first measure the uncertainty that we would have about
whether an incumbent cast a conservative vote on any given bill if we did
not know the incumbent’s party. Then, I measure how much uncertainty we
have about whether the incumbent cast a conservative bill if we did know
what party they belong to. The difference between these two measurements
represents how much uncertainty would be reduced on average by knowing
the party that the incumbent belongs to. This difference is the JSD, and is
illustrated in Equation 1 below.
JSD 1
2
(Dem,Rep) =
Uncertainty given that a vote is
cast by a member of either party︷ ︸︸ ︷
H
(1
2
Dem+
1
2
Rep
)
−
Average uncertainty given that a vote is
cast by a member of a specific party︷ ︸︸ ︷(1
2
H(Dem) +
1
2
H(Rep)
)
(1)
To briefly illustrate how the JSD might be used in the case of party records
and how the information in party records has varied over time, I use roll call
votes from the 45-113th Congresses from 1878-2014 to calculate the JSD for
each year5. Let’s assume that we are interested in guessing whether a legisla-
tor will vote yea or nay on a bill. Furthermore, assume that a legislator’s vote
(yea or nay) can be interpreted as taking the liberal or conservative side of the
issue along a single left-right ideological dimension6. Given these assumptions,
we could use Equation 1 below to measure the information gained by know-
ing a legislator’s party label. In this equation, Dem and Rep are probability
distributions over a binary random variable that scores liberal votes as 0 and
conservative votes as 1. An observer might estimate each of these distributions
by using each party’s legislative record in Congress. Therefore, consistent with
the literature on partisan lawmaking, Equation 1 implies that party labels are
informative because they are linked to specific legislative records, which en-
code ideological brands (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007; Snyder and Ting
2003; Woon and Pope 2008). The party JSD measures the amount of informa-
tion that is generally contained in parties’ legislative records, rather than the
information contained in any specific party’s legislative record. The party JSD
is calculated over the parties’ entire legislative record because it is a measure
of how much information is produced by the parties’ legislative activities in
5All data is obtained from http://voteview.com. Following Poole and Rosenthal (2007),
all consensus votes were removed.
6The JSD does not require that we restrict ourselves to a single dimension. This is just
to simplify the example.
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Congress. It is not a measure of how much information is consumed by any
particular voter.
For each bill, I code whether a yea vote is conservative or liberal using the
following procedure: First, I take the median first dimension DW-NOMINATE
score of the legislators who voted yea. Then, I take the median first dimension
DW-NOMINATE score for legislators who voted nay. If the median score of
legislators who voted “yea” is greater than (i.e. more conservative than) the
median ideology score of legislators who voted “nay,” then a “yea” vote on the
bill is classified as a conservative vote (1). Otherwise, it is coded liberal (0).
For each party, I then calculate the proportion of conservative votes cast in
a given year, pr(con), and use this as the estimate of the probability that a
candidate from the party takes a conservative vote on any particular bill. I use
1−pr(con) or pr(lib) to estimate the probability that party members take the
liberal side of a vote. Using these estimated probability distributions, party
JSD is calculated according to Equation 1 above. The JSD for each year from
1878-2014 as seen in Figure 1 below exhibits considerable variation over time.
Figure 1: Party JSD: Variation in Party JSD in the last 130 years
Information in Parties' 
Legislative Records
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
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D
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Theoretically, our measure of information, the JSD, can vary between 0
and 1. A JSD of 1 means that the parties are perfectly distinguishable from
one another (most informative). In contrast, a JSD of 0 means that in terms
of ideological voting records, the parties are not distinguishable at all.
Figure 2: Party JSD Example: 101st Congress (1990)
Figure 2 illustrates how the JSD can be applied to how people voted (yea
/ nay) ideologically for the 101st Congress in 1990. Figure 2 tells us that for
all votes made by legislators in 1990, the probability that a given vote by a
legislator was conservative was 0.41, while the probability of a liberal vote was
0.59. If we are trying to guess how a legislator voted (without knowing which
party they are from), this distribution of votes leaves us highly uncertain about
the correct answer7. If we break this mixture of all votes down by party, we see
that for Republican legislators (red box), the probability of a given legislator
making a conservative vote was 0.65 and the probability of making a liberal
vote was 0.35. Similarly, for Democratic legislators (blue box), the probability
of making a conservative vote was 0.18, while the probability of making a literal
vote was 0.82. In addition, the uncertainty that we have regarding the voting
behaviors of Democrats is much smaller (H = 0.67) than the uncertainty than
we have regarding Republican legislators (H = 0.93). Overall, the JSD for
1990 was 0.18, meaning that at this time in history, the party label contained
a relatively small amount of information in terms of ideological voting records.
The party label JSD varies over bills and years, and in recent years, has
become increasingly more informative than in the past. As seen in Table 1
7The entropy (H) for this mixture of votes represented by the purple boxes is very high
(0.98 out of 1.00) meaning that we are very uncertain.
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Table 1: Party Label JSD (1970-2010)
Year Party Label JSD
1970 0.03
1980 0.10
1990 0.17
2000 0.24
2010 0.42
and Figure 1, there is considerable variation in the party label JSD since 1970
and more generally, over the last 130 years. Because the party label JSD
tells us exactly how much information the party label conveyed in a given
year, we can use this measurement to recreate the information environment
that an individual was exposed to during that time. To illustrate, recall that
in the 101st Congress example, the mixed (purple) distribution of liberal /
conservative votes included all votes taken during 1990. The JSD in 1990 thus
gives us the amount of information that was conveyed by the party label for
this year. To mimic the information environment of 1990, we can find a single
bill where the distribution of yea / nay votes within each party matches the
distribution of conservative / liberal votes in a given year.
For example, in 2004, the party label JSD was 0.43. I can mimic this level
of information with a single bill that has the following characteristics:
Overall, on this bill,
213 legislators voted in favor of the bill and 214 legislators voted against the
bill.
In terms of the distribution of yea / nay votes by party,
Democrats who voted in favor of the bill: 199/250
Republicans who voted in favor of the bill: 14/177
We can see here that knowing the yea / nay distribution on the bill overall
is not helpful as it is 50 / 50. However, we know that the party label is highly
informative (0.43) and this is demonstrated by the breakdown of yea / nay
votes by party. When thinking about how a Democratic legislator voted on this
bill, it is overwhelmingly likely that they voted in favor of the bill. Instead,
if asked to guess about how a Republican legislator voted on this bill, it is
highly likely that they voted against the bill. Here, knowing the party that
a legislator is from greatly increases the probability that we would correctly
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guess how they voted on this bill.
To test the theory and the hypothesis that as party labels become more
informative about how individual candidates will vote, citizens will be less
willing to invest costly effort in learning about how the candidate actually
voted, I will construct a set of bills where the distribution of yea / nay votes
within each party matches with the distribution of liberal / conservative votes
in a year. Here, each bill will match a different party label JSD for a given
year, allowing for a comparison of information-seeking behavior over time.
The goal is to use this set of bills that represents the informativeness
of the partly label over time to see whether more informative yea / nay vote
distributions (higher JSD and more informative party labels) cause individuals
to be less willing to pay for information about whether a legislator voted yea
or nay on the bill. This is analogous to how more informative distributions of
conservative / liberal votes may have made people less willing to invest costly
effort into finding out how their individual representative actually voted in
Congress. In the following section, I detail an experiment using a set of bills
matching different party label JSDs to test this idea.
4 Decision-Theoretic Experiment
This paper seeks to examine the effect of the increasing information level
of party labels on willingness to obtain additional information using actual
information levels over the past five decades. To test the hypothesis, I employ
an experimental research design. The design is based on the idea that there is
a certain level of information that is contained in the party label and individual
legislator voting records.
When the party label becomes more informative (JSD goes to 1), it is
expected that individuals will place more weight on the party label and less
weight on individual legislators’ voting records. This is because a JSD of
1 indicates that knowing the party label allows voters to perfectly predict
how an individual representative votes. Thus, as the party label increases in
informativeness, respondents given the party label of a legislator should be
less willing to pay for information on individual legislators, even when the
goal is correctly identifying an individual legislator’s vote. In this way, the
party label acts as an information subsidy – even though it is cheaper to get
candidate information nowadays, the high information level of the party label
makes acquiring individual legislator information uneconomical.
To explain how individuals can gauge the informativeness of the party
label using the bills chosen to mimic the information environment in a given
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Table 2: Close Vote Example
Bill
Democrat
Yea
Democrat
Nay
Republican
Yea
Republican
Nay
Total
Yea
Total
Nay
JSD
1 25 25 25 25 50 50 0
2 50 0 0 50 50 50 1
year, imagine that there are 50 Democrats and 50 Republicans for a total of
100 members of Congress. For the first bill in Table 2, exactly half each party
votes for the bill. This means that 25 of the Democrat members and 25 of
the Republican members vote yea. Similarly, 25 Democrat members and 25
Republican members vote against the bill for a total of 50 yeas and 50 nays.
Because this distribution gives us no information, the JSD is 0 – the parties
are not distinguishable. In contrast, for the second bill, imagine that all 50 of
the Democratic members vote yea and all 50 of the Republican members vote
nay. Although the total is still 50 yeas and 50 nays, because the parties are
completely distinguishable, Bill 2 has a JSD of 1.
In the no party label condition of the experiment, Bill 1 and Bill 2 have
the same amount of information (50 yeas and 50 nays). If the task is to guess
if a given member of Congress voted yea or nay, you have a 50/50 chance
of being right for both Bill 1 and Bill 2, since you do not know the party
label of the member. Therefore, individuals should pay the same amount for
additional information about how the individual legislator in question voted
in both of these scenarios (Bill 1 and Bill 2).
In contrast, in the party label condition, despite the fact that each bill
has 50 yeas and 50 nays, the JSD of the two bills are very different. Since Bill
1 has a JSD of 0, individuals should pay for additional information on how the
member in question voted. This is because even though they have the party
label to use, it does not provide them with any additional information to use.
However, on Bill 2, since the party label of the member is known and the JSD is
1, individuals should never pay for additional information because knowing the
party label is all the information that is needed to make a correct prediction.
Following this logic, as the JSD increases from 0 to 1, individuals should be
less willing to pay for additional information in the party label condition as
the party label increases in informativeness.
The basic experimental set-up is shown in Figure 3. Participants are told
that they will receive a bonus ($1) if they correctly guess how the legislator
voted on the given bill. In the first part of the experiment, participants are
presented with information on the distribution of legislator votes for a specific
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bill that received a roll call vote (Stage 1). Bills used in the experiment were
selected to match the overall JSD for the House of Representatives by year.
The distribution of roll call votes on a bill within each party matched the
distribution of conservative and liberal votes cast by each party in a given
year. Therefore, the party label of a candidate conveys the same amount of
information (about how the candidate voted on the bill) as the candidate’s
party label would have conveyed about their propensity to vote conservatively
in a given year. This means that the bill-level JSD for a given bill is identical to
a yearly JSD between the years of 1970-2010 (Table 1). Furthermore, despite
varying the underlying bill-level JSD, only close votes (50% yea, 50% nay) are
used in this experiment. This allows each bill to have the same baseline level
of information, absent a party label (Table 2).
Participants are randomly assigned to receive one of two informational
treatments: party label (Democrat or Republican) or no party label (Stage
2). Participants face a cost to acquire more information. If they choose to
pay nothing, they will get a signal that is essentially a coin flip with a 50/50
chance of accuracy. On the other hand, if the participant chooses to pay $0.02
or $0.50, they will get a signal that is 52% or 100% accurate, respectively.
Lastly, after receiving the signal according to their willingness to pay in Stage
3, the participant is asked to give their best guess of how the legislator in
question voted on the bill (Stage 4). Participants are paid $1.00 - signal cost
for a correct guess and $0 otherwise for one randomly selected trial.
This creates two distinct cases (Table 3). Participants complete a total
of seven trials with varying bill-level JSDs under the same set of randomly
assigned conditions, making this a between-subjects design.
Figure 4 is what participants in the experiment see. The top panel is
a participant in the control condition which has “not available” as the party
label. The bottom panel is a participant in the treatment condition who has
“Republican” on the current trial, but randomly receives either “Democrat”
or “Republican” for each trial. What is important to note here is that, for
participants in the control condition (top), the only piece of information they
can use is the 50/50 yea / nay distribution. They are not able to make use
of the second piece of information – the distribution of yea / nay votes by
party, because they do not have access to the party label of the legislator. We
would therefore expect these participants8 to pay some sum of money greater
than zero for more information because they always have a 50/50 chance of
answering correctly without more information. In contrast, for participants in
the treatment condition (bottom), these individuals can use the distribution
8Given that they have a normal range of risk aversion.
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Figure 3: Trial Set-up: Example trial using 1980 JSD
Table 3: Experimental Design: informational level and conditions
Varying JSD by Year
Party Label Bill1JSD , Bill2JSD , · · · , Bill7JSD
No Party Label Bill1JSD , Bill2JSD , · · · , Bill7JSD
of yea / nay votes within each party. Therefore, we would expect treatment
condition participants to be willing to pay less than individuals in the control
condition because the distribution of votes within each party provides them
with some information about how the candidate voted. In the particular case
shown in Figure 4, subjects would know that the candidate (a Republican)
was more likely than not to vote against the bill.
Despite the final stage being the participant’s guess regarding the legisla-
tor’s vote, the dependent variable of interest in this experiment is willingness
to pay for information. The hypothesis posits that as the party label becomes
more informative, individuals will be less likely to invest costly effort into
learning about an individual candidate’s voting record. Here, willingness to
invest costly effort is modeled by monetary costs – to get more information
about how the individual legislator that is being asked about voted, individ-
uals must pay in cents. This is meant to capture the idea that in the real
world, individuals must invest costly effort such as time to learn more about
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Figure 4: Top: A participant in the control condition. Bottom: A participant
in the treatment condition.
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individual legislators’ voting records. It is acceptable to use willingness to pay
for a hint in the experiment as a proxy for costly effort even though willingness
to pay is not elicited in the real world.
For each trial, participants are asked how much they would be willing
to pay to get additional information to help them make their decision. This
monetary value becomes the dependent variable. With multiple trials, the
objective is to compare willingness to pay for an additional signal on bills with
different party JSDs (over time).
In the no party label condition, I expect there to be a similar willingness
to pay across JSDs because the vote distribution for close votes (50% yea /
50% nay) is not informative and the participant is unsure of the party label of
the legislator in each trial. Therefore, they should be willing to pay a relatively
similar amount for additional information across all JSD levels since they are
not given any party labels to make use of.
In contrast, in the party label condition, I expect that as the informa-
tiveness of the party label increases (JSD increases), individuals’ willingness
to pay for individual legislator information will decrease. As the distribution
of votes between Democrats and Republicans becomes increasingly different,
individuals who are given the party label will be able to make better predic-
tions. Therefore, they will be less willing to pay for additional information
in this case. As the distributions become more similar (JSD decreases), even
individuals with the party label will have an increasingly hard time deriving
information from it. Therefore, they will be more willing to pay for additional
information.
With regard to willingness to pay for information, I compare the indi-
viduals who get the party label versus those that do not (Figure 5). Within
each of the conditions, I vary the potential informativeness of the party label
(JSD) while keeping the overall number of yeas and nays on each bill relatively
equal. Individuals who receive the party label treatment, should be less willing
to pay for additional information. The cost of obtaining additional information
matters less for individuals with the party label given as we move from low
informativeness of the party label to high informativeness (JSD). Therefore,
the difference between willingness to pay in the party label condition (red) and
willingness to pay in the no party label condition (blue) should become larger
as the party JSD increases.
In the no party label condition, individuals’ willingness to pay should
be relatively the same across all of the different JSD levels. This is because
they are given no party label and the yea / nay distribution of a close vote
does not give them any additional information or the chance to increase their
probability of making a correct guess without paying for additional information
67
Figure 5: Pre-Registered Hypothesis Expected Results: Relationship
between WTP and JSD
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on the legislator’s individual voting record.
While this experiment is quite abstract, this level of abstractness helps
us to investigate the mechanism by which individuals have come to invest
less in learning about individual candidates’ voting records. By holding all
else constant but the informativeness of the party label (JSD), this allows us
to determine if increasingly informative party labels have caused individuals
to be less willing to invest effort into learning about individual candidate
information.
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5 Data and Methods
This experiment was pre-registered with the Open Science Foundation9
and data was collected using Qualtrics and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk10. Par-
ticipants were screened to be at least 18 years of age and reside in the United
States. The 1199 participants were randomly assigned to one of two experi-
mental conditions: party label or no party label. Each participant completed
multiple trials under the same condition (i.e. party label or no party label).
Figure 6 shows the results from the experiment. Because the seven trials
are equally spaced in terms of JSD jumps from one trial to another, there is
no year associated with the last trial. For ease of discussion, since this trial’s
JSD is closest to 2008, I will use 2008 as its year. The hypothesis is supported,
as individuals in the party label condition are indeed less willing to pay for an
additional piece of information, compared to individuals in the no party label
condition, over time (p − value = 0.0004). Additionally, as the party JSD
increases, the difference in willingness to pay between the party label and the
no party label conditions generally increases. From 1970 to 2008, willingness
to pay for information has dropped by about 30%.
We would also expect that there is not a significant difference between the
WTP of individuals in the no party label condition between 1970 and 2008.
This is indeed the case, as the average willingness to pay for respondents is
not significantly different between the two years (p − value = 0.4991). Sub-
sequently, we should expect a difference in WTP between 1970 and 2008 for
participants in the party label condition. This is also the case. Participants
in the party label condition are willing to pay significantly less for additional
information in 2008 (when the JSD is over 4 times as high) than in 1970
(p − value = 0.0004). Finally, there is a significant difference between the
amount that participants in the no party label versus participants in the party
label condition are willing to pay in 2008 (p− value > 0.0000).
6 Discussion and Conclusion
While previous experiments have not controlled the benefit of voting cor-
rectly or the cost of acquiring more information, the design of the current
experiment allows for control of both of these factors. In addition, this ex-
periment varies the informational value of the party label to mimic real-world
9https://osf.io/dg43e/
10This experiment was reviewed and approved by the University of California, Merced
IRB (UCM2017-151).
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Figure 6: Results: Relationship between WTP and JSD
changes over the last five decades. This is done by first computing how much
information is contained in the party label in a given year using roll-call votes.
The resulting measure, the JSD, tells how distinct or distinguishable the votes
of each party’s members are along the left-right ideological spectrum (in terms
of the propensity to make conservative or liberal votes). This measure is com-
puted for every year and shows considerable variation throughout the years
(Figure 1). The JSD can be computed for years or bills, and in this case, each
yearly JSD is matched to an individual bill-level JSD. This matching means
that the party label of a candidate conveys the same amount of information
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(about how the candidate voted on the bill) as the candidate’s party label
would have conveyed about their propensity to vote conservatively in a given
year. This means that the bill-level JSD for a given bill is identical to a yearly
JSD between the years of 1970-2010 (Table 1) and tells us how distinct the
party members’ votes are on a given bill. By matching a bill-level JSD with a
yearly JSD, this experiment is able to vary the informational value of the party
label over time, using actual bills for individual trials, without participants re-
alizing what bill or year they are being asked about. This study compares
participants’ willingness to pay for additional information over a variety of
party label informational levels (yearly JSDs) by using multiple trials (one
year per trial).
Since the 1970s, both the informational level of the party label and the
informational level of individual members’ legislative records have increased.
However, the informational level of the party label has increased at a higher
rate. This may be why there has been an increase in party line voting because
knowing the party label is easier and just as effective as knowing a legislator’s
entire voting record. This experiment investigates the effect of varying the level
of information that is contained in the party label. More specifically, it tests
whether increasing levels of information conveyed by the party label has caused
voters to invest less in learning about their representatives’ individual voting
records. The results suggest that this may indeed be the case, as willingness
to pay for information when the party label is known has decreased by about
30% over time.
This result is important because it might signal a change in the level of
representativeness in the United States. There is evidence that people have
become more party-centric regarding what they know about and how they
evaluate candidates. A large part of this change in what voters are willing
to learn about their representatives is driven by the increase of information
contained in the party label. If parties continue to vote in blocks and in more
ideologically homogeneous ways, using the party label is increasingly effective.
However, this means that voters are holding representatives accountable on the
basis of the party, not on their individual voting record in Congress. If voters
are not aware of the voting behavior of their representatives in Congress and
how it differs from their party’s voting record, this weakens the incentive of
members of Congress to vote according to their district’s preferences. Finally,
this type of behavior could decrease the incumbency advantage. One of the
many benefits to being an incumbent is having an individual voting record to
run on. If voters are not paying attention to individual records, however, this
could decrease this aspect of the incumbency advantage.
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8 Appendix
Method of Measurement
Here, I begin by briefly introducing two key concepts from information
theory, which may be unfamiliar to many political scientists: entropy and
mutual information. Readers who are already familiar with these concepts
may wish to skip over these sections, and go directly to the section on the
Jensen-Shannon Divergence.
Entropy
The JSD is based upon Shannon Entropy, which is defined by:
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
P (xi) log2 P (xi) (2)
H(X) is a measure of uncertainty about a discrete random variable X.
For example, X might be a binary random variable that represents whether
a legislator casts a liberal or conservative vote on a particular bill. This mea-
sure of uncertainty is maximized when there is an equal probability of each
value xi. Therefore, continuing with the previous example, uncertainty about
how the legislator will vote is highest when the legislator casts liberal and
conservative votes with equal probability, in which case H(X) = 1. On the
other hand, there will be no uncertainty if the legislator always casts liberal
(or conservative) votes, in which case H(X) = 0.
The entropy of a random variable, H(X), can also be interpreted as a
measure of how much information is revealed by a data generating process.
Under this interpretation, realizations of X convey more information if you
are more uncertain prior to observing a given realization. For example, seeing
a legislator cast a liberal vote will convey no new information if you already
know that the legislator always takes the liberal side of an issue. However, it
will convey quite a bit of information if you initially believe there is a 50/50
chance that the legislator will cast a liberal or conservative vote (i.e. this is
the situation where entropy is maximized).
Mutual Information
Mutual information is defined by the equation
I(X, Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) (3)
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where, H(X|Y ) = ∑j∈M H(X|yj)P (yj). Because H(X) ≥ H(X|Y ), mutual
information is always positive, and is a measure how much the entropy of X
is reduced if you know the realization of another variable, Y . For example, Y
might represent the party of a particular legislator. If party affiliation is highly
correlated with the ideology of a legislator’s votes, then knowing Y (the party
of a legislator) may substantially reduce one’s uncertainty about X (whether
the legislator takes the conservative or liberal side of a particular vote).
An alternative interpretation of I(X, Y ) is that it is a measure of the quan-
tity of information Y provides about X. Under this interpretation, knowing Y
will only provide you with new information about X if you are initially uncer-
tain about X. To see this, note that if H(X) = 0 (i.e. there is zero uncertainty
about X), then I(X, Y ) = 0 as well. Furthermore, Y only provides informa-
tion about X to the extent X and Y are correlated. To continue the example
above, if you are uncertain about a legislator’s position, knowing their party
affiliation will provide information to the extent that liberal or conservative
votes are correlated with being a legislator from a particular party.
8.1 The Jensen-Shannon Divergence
The Jensen-Shannon divergence (Lin 1991) generalizes the concepts of
entropy and mutual information to encompass situations where an observer
knows that data is generated by one of n distributions. It then characterizes
how much uncertainty is reduced if each of the n distributions are labeled,
such that the observer knows exactly which distribution is generating a given
set of data. The JSD is the mutual information between the labels and the
aggregate data (Lin 1991).
JSDpi1,··· ,pin(P1,··· ,Pn) =
Uncertainty over a mixture
of n unlabeled distributions︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(
n∑
i=1
piiPi) −
Average uncertainty
of n labeled distributions︷ ︸︸ ︷
n∑
i=1
piiH(Pi) (4)
In Equation 4 above, pi1 · · · pin are the weights assigned to each distribution
Pi. Usually these weights are simply pii = 1/n for all n distributions, but can
be adjusted to reflect the prior probability that data comes from a particular
distribution. When entropy is defined using logarithms with base 2 (as in
Equation 2 in the Appendix), the JSD is bounded between 0 and 1.
